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NOTES
GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO
PREVENT CHILD ABUSE: A RATIONALE FOR
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
The protection of children from child abuser has become one of society's primary
concerns. 2
 Legislation in all fifty states requires most medical, educational, social work,
child care, and law enforcement professionals to report suspected cases of child abuse
to child protection agencies.' These agencies are mandated to receive and investigate
reports of suspected child abuse and to provide protective services to abuse victims and •
their families.; Mandatory reporting laws and public awareness campaigns to publicize
these laws have been extremely effective in identifying suspected victims of child abuse. 5
In 1983, approximately 1.3 million children were reported to child protection agencies
as suspected victims of abuse."
Unfortunately, the reporting of a suspected case of abuse to a child protection
agency does not ensure the future safety of an abused child.? Many children suffer
further injuries as a result of child abuse, even after a report of suspected abuse has
been made on their behalf to a child protection agency." Studies reveal that approxi-
mately one quarter of all deaths resulting from abuse involve children who already have
been reported to child protection agencies,9
 and many more children suffer further
injuries short of death after being reported as suspected victims of abuse.w
' The problem of defining child abuse has received substantial treatment in legal literature and
is beyond the scope of this note. See, e.g., Besharov, State Intervention to Protect Children: New York's
Definitions of "Child Abuse" and "Child Neglect", 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 723 (1981).
2 ANTLER, Child Abuse: An Emerging Social Priority, in CHILD ABUSE AND CHILD PROTECTION:
POLICY AND PRACTICE; 8 (S. Antler ed. 1982).
' Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems, and Future Directions, 17 FAM. L.Q.
151, 154 (1983) [hereinafter Besharov, Future Directions]. For an exhaustive listing of state child
protection statutes, see Note, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State Child Abuse
Statutes, 50 GEO. WASH. L. RE:V. 243, 272-74 (1982) [hereinafter State Child Abuse Statutes].
L. Brown and J. Riley, Agency Procedures with Abuse Reports, Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Winter 1984-
85, at 45. [hereinafter Agency Procedures],
5 Besharov, Future Directions, .supra note 3, at 154.
" Besharov, Child Welfare Malpractice, TRIAL MAC., March 1984, at 56. [hereinafter Besharov,
Child Welfare Malpractice]. 1983 is the latest year for which statistics have been obtained for this
note.
Besharov, Future Directions, supra note 3, at 163.
8 See id.
"Id. (citing Region VI Resource Center on Child Abuse, Child Deaths in Texas, p.26 (Univ. of
Texas, Graduate School of Social Work, 1981); Mayberry, Child Protective Services in New York City:
An Analysis of Case Management 109 (Welfare Research lnc., Albany, N.Y., draft dated May 1979)).
'° Besharov, Future Directions, supra note 3, at 163.
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The failure of the child protection system to prevent the further abuse of children
who already have been identified as suspected victims of abuse has led to an emerging
pattern of civil lawsuits against the government and government child protection work-
ers. 11 Negligence claims have been filed against child protection workers in state courts
for failing to conduct mandated investigations into reports of abuse." Child protection
workers also have been sued for negligence for failing to take adequate action to protect
children from further abuse after investigating an abuse report." Furthermore, child
protection workers have been subjected to civil suits for failing to prevent children who
have been placed in foster care from being abused by their foster parents." In related'
cases, child protection workers have been subjected to civil lawsuits, not for failing to
protect abused children but instead, for malicious prosecution or for depriving parents
of parental rights during the course of child abuse proceedings."
in two recent cases, the estates of three deceased children brought suits in
federal courts against government child protection workers and agencies for failing
to prevent the children from being abused by their parents after reports of abuse
in the children's families had been made.'" These suits were brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which provides a civil cause of action against anyone
who, acting under color of state law, causes any person to be deprived of rights
guaranteed by the laws or Constitution of the United States. 17 The courts in Jensen v.
Besharov, Child Welfare Malpractice, supra note 6, at 56.
See, e.g., Mammo v. State, 138 Ariz. 528, 675 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). In Mamma, a
divorced, noncustodial father of a child who had been fatally abused by her mother filed a wrongful
death action against the state and the state child protection agency. Prior to the death of the child,
the father had filed a report of suspected abuse concerning two of his children after he noticed
bruises on them during a visit. Id. at 1349. The child protection agency did not investigate the
report and instead recommended that the father consult an attorney to contest his ex-wife's custody
of the children. Id. The Arizona Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff
and a subsequent damage award of $300,000. Id. at 1349, 1353.
' 3 See Bross, Professional and Agency Liability for Negligence in Child Protection, 11 L., MEn. &
HEALTH CARE 71, 72 (1983) (citing Buege v. Iowa, No. 20521 ( July 30, 1980); Fischer v. Iowa Dept
of Social Serv., No. C. 1664-280 (Feb. 18, 1980)).
' 4 See, e.g., Barnes v. County of Nassau, 108 A.D.2d 510, 487 N.Y.S.2d 827 (App. Div. 1985);
Koepf v. York, 198 Neb. 67, 251 N.W.2d 866 (1977); Vonner v. Louisiana, 273 So. 2d 252 (La.
1973); Elton v. County of' Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (App. Ct. 1970).
13 See, e.g., Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456 (6th Cir. 1984); Pepper v. Alexander, 599 F.
Supp. 523 (D.N.M. 1984); Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093 (W.D.N.Y. 1983);
Doe v. County of Suffolk, 494 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); LaBelle v. County of St. Lawrence,
85 A.D.2d 759, 445 N.Y.S.2d 275 (App. Div. 1981).
' 6 See Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985); Jensen v. Conrad, 747
F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1754 (1985).
17 Section 1983, originally section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982), and provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871 to enforce the Civil War Amendments
in the hostile southern states. See Davidson• v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 826 n.5 (3d Cir. 1985), uff
on other grounds sub nom. Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986). Section 1983 was enacted in
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Conrad and Estate of Bailey v. County of York" held that a constitutional right to receive
protection by the state could arise under the fourteenth amendment 26 if a "special
relationship" exists between the state and an abused child. 2 ' These decisions therefore
establish that child protection workers and agencies who fail to protect an abused child
may be subjected to civil suit for depriving the child of fourteenth amendment. rights.
The potential for courts to hold the government and child protection workers liable
under section 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act for failing to protect a child who
reportedly has been abused presents many difficult legal issues, as well as a host of social
policy implications. The recent suits indicate that a plaintiff will have a heavy burden in
establishing the presence of several elements necessary to recover in a section 1983 claim
against the government and its workers for failing to protect abused children. Despite
the heavy burden on plaintiffs, however, the cases make clear that recovery in such a
section 1983 claim is possible. The threat of potential liability likely will deter child
protection workers from exercising their best professional judgment in child abuse
investigations. Instead, workers will be encouraged to use drastic methods of intervention
into the families of suspected abuse victims in order to protect children from further
abuse and therefore avoid liability. In most cases, however, drastic intervention will not
be necessary to protect the child and may even be harmful to the child and the family.
Due to the negative consequences which would result from subjecting members of the
child protection system to liability for failing to protect abused children, the government
and its workers should be absolutely immune from such suits.
This note will examine the recent suits under section 1983 against government child
protection workers and agencies for failing to protect children from abuse. Section I will
trace the historical development of a constitutional right to receive protection from the
state from injuries inflicted by private persons. 22
 Next, section 1 will discuss the standard
of conduct which plaintiffs must prove in order to recover under section 1983 for the
deprivation of a constitutional right. 2 '' Section I will conclude with a discussion of the
governmental immunity doctrines which sometimes prevent plaintiffs from recovering
in section 1983 actions." Section II will review the two recent federal court cases in
which plaintiffs sought to impose liability upon the government and its workers who,
after receiving and investigating reports of suspected abuse, failed to protect children
from fatal abuse inflicted by their caretakers." Section III first will analyze, in light of
these decisions, the elements necessary to recover- in a section 1983 suit against members
of the child protection system who fail to protect children from abuse. 26 This section will
response to outrages committed by the Ku Klux Klan which went unpunished by state officials. Id.
For a discussion of the background of section 1983 and the development of the statute as a means
of protecting constitutional rights. sec Note, Developments in the Law, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
" 747 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1754 (1985).
19
 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985).
"The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that a state may not "deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. Coxs'r. amend. XIV, § 1.
21 Bailey, 768 F.2d at 509; Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194.
" See infra notes 29-86 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 87-1 l 1 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 112-167 and accompanying text
25 See infra notes 168-257 and accompanying text
26 See infra notes 259-95 and accompanying text.
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then discuss the negative social policy implications of exposing the government and its
workers to liability for failing to prevent child abuse." Finally, Section III will conclude
that, based on these negative implications, the government and its workers should be
absolutely immune from civil suits under section 1983 for failing to protect children
from abuse inflicted by their parents."
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE SECTION 1983 CAUSE OF ACTION
A. The Development of a Constitutional Right to Receive Protection by the Government
Two recent suits in federal courts seeking damages against government child pro-
tection workers and agencies for failing to prevent child abuse were brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 29 Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action in federal court
against any person" who, acting under color of state law, causes another person to be
subjected to the deprivation of a right guaranteed by the laws or Constitution of the
United States.3 ' In recent years, courts have recognized that an individual has a consti-
tutional right, in certain situations, to be protected by the government from injuries
inflicted by private individuals."
The genesis of the notion that the state has a constitutionally based duty to provide
protection to persons from the actions of other private individuals can be traced to cases
in which inmates, incarcerated in state prisons, asserted that the state's failure to protect
them subjected them to a deprivation of their constitutional rights." The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in the 1973 case of Woodhous v. Virginia," was the first court to establish
the state's duty to protect prisoners from injuries inflicted by other prisoners. In Wood-
hous, a prison inmate brought a complaint in federal district court alleging that the state
subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendments'
because the state did not protect him adequately from violence and sexual assaults by
other prisoners," The Fourth Circuit held that an inmate in a state prison has a right,
grounded in the eighth amendment, to be protected from the constant threat of violence
and sexual assault by fellow inmates." Thus, the court concluded that the eighth amend-
ment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment imposed an affirmative duty
"See infra notes 296-339 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 340-63 and accompanying text.
" See Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 505 (3d Cir. 1985); Jensen v. Conrad,
747 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1754 (1985).
36 In Monet! v. New York City Dept of Social Servs., the Supreme Court held that "munici-
palities and other local government units [are] included among those persons to whom § 1983
applies." 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
"42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). For the text of § 1983 and a discussion of its historical basis, see
supra note 17.
32 See, e.g., Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983); Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817,
821 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986). See
also infra notes 45-86 and accompanying text.
" See Jensen, 747 F.2d at 190.
34 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973).
" The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "f e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsr,
amend. VIII.
Woodhous, 487 F.2d at 889.
" Id. at 890.
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upon the state to provide protection to inmates, not only from injuries inflicted by the
state itself, but also from injuries inflicted by other inmates."
Subsequent to Woodhaus, the Supreme Court in the 1976 decision Estelle v. Gamble"
also held that the state has a duty under the eighth amendment to provide protection
to persons the state has incarcerated. In Estelle, an inmate of the Texas Department of
Corrections who was injured while performing a prison work assignment brought a
section 1983 action against prison officials." The inmate alleged that the medical treat-
ment he received subsequent to his injury was inadequate, thereby subjecting him to
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.'" The Supreme
Court held that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners amounts
to "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," which the eighth amendment prohib-
ition against cruel and unusual punishment proscribes." In imposing a duty upon the
state to provide protection to inmates in the form of adequate medical care, the Court
reasoned that it was only fair to require the public to provide care for inmates who,
because of their incarceration, were unable to care for themselves." Thus, the decisions
in Woodhaus and Estelle, and their progeny," firmly establish that the state owes a duty,
grounded in the eighth amendment, to provide protection to persons it incarcerates.
Other courts have treated prisoners' section 1983 suits against prison officials for
failing to protect them as raising claims under the fourteenth amendment." In the 1984
's Id.
39 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
4° Id. at 98.
41 Id. at 101, 107. Prison doctors had diagnosed the inmate's injury as a lower back strain and
treated it with bed rest, muscle relaxants, and pain relievers. Id. at 107. The inmate claimed that
the doctors should have better diagnosed and treated the back injury. Id.
4.2 Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, J.J.)). The Supreme Court in Estelle went on to find that the allegations of the
complaint did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs , and
thus, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Id.
at 107. The Court found that the complaint, at most, alleged a claim for medical malpractice and
that the proper forum for such a claim was a state court under the state tort claims act. Id. at 106
n.14, 107.
" Id. at 103-04 (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926)).
" See, e.g., Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 1981), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (verdict sustained against corrections officer for violating eighth
amendment by placing prisoner in a dangerous situation where it was foreseeable that another
inmate would sexually assault the prisoner); Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980) (constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment re-
quires prison officials to exercise reasonable care to provide protection to inmates under a known
risk of harm of homosexual attacks by other inmates).
4 ' See, e.g., Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 821 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986). See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16
(1982) (involuntarily committed resident of state institution for mentally retarded who was injured
on numerous occasions by himself and other residents has a right protected by the fourteenth
amendment due process clause to safe conditions of confinement); Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d
1120, 1125 (5th Cir. 1983) (verdict upheld against sheriff and deputy for depriving prisoner of
rights under the fourteenth amendment by failing to prevent beating inflicted by fellow jail inmates);
Holmes v. Goldin, 615 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1980) (inmate assaulted by another prisoner is entitled
to prove purposeful acts or deliberate indifference on the part of corrections officers in failing to
prevent the attack amounting to a violation of due process); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 556-
57 (7th Cir. 1974) (allegations that employees and agents of a state hospital failed to protect an
inmate from being beaten to death by another inmate stated cause of action under § 1983 for
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case Davidson v. O'Lone,'" for example, a state prison inmate brought a claim against
prison officials for failing to protect him from injuries inflicted by another prisoner. In
finding that the inmate had a right to be protected by the state, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the inmate had a liberty interest, guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment due process clause, in being free from attack." The court stated that this
right to be free from attack was not limited to attacks by state officials themselves, but
extended also to attacks by fellow prisoners." The Davidson court reasoned that because
incarcerated persons were not free to leave the confines of the prison, which they were
forced to share with other prisoners, the state bore the responsibility of protecting the
inmates from the actions of each other. 49 Therefore, whether based on the eighth
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment or the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause, courts have found that incarcerated persons possess a right to
receive protection by the state, including the right to be protected from the actions of
fellow inmates.
In 1980, the Supreme Court's decision in Martinez v. California5° began a line of
cases which ultimately resulted in the expansion beyond the prison context of the state's
duty to protect individuals from the actions of other private persons. In Martinez, a
parolee murdered a fifteen-year-old girl five months after his release on parole from a
California prison. 5 ' The girl's survivors brought a section 1983 claim against members
of the parole board, alleging that by releasing the parolee from prison, the parole board
members deprived the girl of her life without due process of law in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. 52
The Supreme Court found that the members of the parole board did not deprive
the girl of her life within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. 53 The Court held
that the girl's death was too remote a consequence of the parole officers' actions to hold
them responsible and therefore the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim. The Court
found it significant that the murder occurred five months after the parolee's release and
that the parolee was in no sense an agent of the parole board. In addition, the Court
noted, the parole board members were not aware that the victim of the murder, as
distinguished from the public at large, faced any special danger.
Because the Martinez Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim on causation grounds, it
did not address directly the issue of whether the state had a duty under the fourteenth
amendment to protect the girl from the actions of the parolee."' The Court did leave
deprivation of fourteenth amendment due process rights); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516, 518
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974) (due process clause is a valid basis for prisoner's
§ 1983 action seeking relief for injuries inflicted by another prisoner).
" 752 F•2d 817, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1984).
" Id. at 821-22. The Supreme Court affirmed the Davidson case on other grounds in Davidson
v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision, see infra notes
104-09 and accompanying text.
" Davidson; 752 F.2d at 822.
" Id. at 821.
5" 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
5 ' Id. at 279-80. The parolee had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one to twenty
years, with the recommendation that he not be paroled, on the charge of attempted rape. Id. at
279. He was paroled after serving five years of the sentence. Id.
71 Id. at 279, 283.
Id. at 285.
"Jensen, 747 E.2r1 at. 19.1.
September 1986]	 CHILD ABUSE	 955
open the possibility, however, that given another set of circumstances, a parole officer
might be found to deprive someone of life by action taken in connection with the release
of a prisoner on parole. 55 The Court stated that it merely held that under the circum-
stances of the particular case before it, the victim's death was too remote a consequence
of the parole officers' action to hold them liable under section 1983. 55 Thus, the Martinez
decision indicated that, given another set of facts, a right to receive protection from the
state from the actions of third parties could arise outside of incarceration situations.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Martinez, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, in the 1981 decision Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Servtces, 57 stated that
the government could violate a constitutionally protected right by failing to protect a
person who had been placed in state custody or care. In Doe, a foster father beat and
sexually abused a young girl who was in the custody of the New York City Commissioner
of Welfare and living in a foster home." The girl filed a section 1983 claim, alleging
that the agency in charge of monitoring the foster home violated a constitutional duty
of care owed to her when it failed to supervise the foster home adequateiy. 59 The jury
returned a verdict awarding the plaintiff $225,000 in damages against the agency due
to the agency's failure to protect the
The Doe decision, although not expressly mentioning the fourteenth amendment,
has been interpreted as indicating that a duty upon the government can arise under that
amendment to protect an individual, placed in state custody or care, from injuries
inflicted by other private parties.''' Thus, the Doe court's decision expanded the right to
receive protection from the state beyond situations where the individual claiming the
right was incarcerated, to include situations where the individual was placed in the
custody or care of the state.52
In the following year, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bowers v. DeVito63
indicated that the state has a constitutional duty to protect individuals who are neither
incarcerated nor in the state's custody. In Bowers, a former patient in an Indiana state
mental hospital murdered Bowers one year after the patient was released from the
55 See Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285. The Court reserved the question of what immunity, if any, was
available to parole officers sued under § 1983 in connection with a parole decision. Id. at 285 n.11.
Id. at 285.
' 7 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981).
" Id, at 137.
59
'") In Doe, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's entry of judgment for
the defendant agency, holding that the jury had not been instructed properly on the meaning of
"deliberate indifference," the standard of conduct necessary to be proved to recover under § 1983.
649 F.2d at 142. On remand to the trial court, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and
assessed damages of $225,000. Doe v. New York City I)ep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 787 (2d
Cir.) (Doe II), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 195 (1983). The trial court judge set aside the verdict and
granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding that the evidence
was so overwhelming that no reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant agency acted with
deliberate indifference. Id. The Second Circuit reversed the trial court's entry of judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, finding that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that the agency
had acted with deliberate indifference. Id. at 792. The Second Circuit therefore reinstated the jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Id.
I" See Jensen, 747 F.2d at 192.
" 2 See id. (citing Doe, 649 F.2d at 141).
", 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
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hospital." Bowers' estate filed a section 1983 claim against officers and physicians of the
state mental hospital, alleging that the defendants knew the murderer was dangerous
and that they acted recklessly in releasing him from the hospita1. 65
In affirming the district court's disinissal .of the complaint, the Seventh Circuit held
that the state did not have any federal constitutional duty to protect its citizens from
being murdered by "criminals and madrnen." 86 The Bowers court stated that there is a
constitutional right not to be murdered by a state official because the state violates the
fourteenth amendment when its officer, acting under color of state law, deprives a person
of life without due process of law.67 The court stated, however, that there is no such
constitutional right to be protected by the state from the actions of private persons. 68
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the federal constitution tells the states to leave people
alone; it does not impose upon the states any duty of affirmative action to protect its
citizens. 6  Therefore, because the Bowers court found that the state had no constitutional
duty to protect Bowers, it upheld the district court's dismissal of the complaint. 70
The Bowers court went on to note, however, that if the state had taken some action
and placed a person in a position of danger, then a constitutional duty upon the state
to protect that person could arise. 71 The court stated that "Lilt is on this theory that state
prison personnel are sometimes held liable ... for the violence of one prison inmate
against another." 72 According to the court, the defendants in Bowers did not place Bowers
in a position of danger; they merely failed to protect her from a "dangerous madman,"
and such failure did not violate any constitutional duty. 73 Thus, although the Bowers
court found no general constitutional duty upon the state to protect persons from the
actions of other private individuals, the court indicated that such a duty of protection
could arise if the state somehow took part in placing a person in a dangerous position.' 4
6' Id. at 617.
65 Id. The murderer had a history of criminal violence prior to killing Bowers. See id. In 1970,
he was convicted of aggravated battery with a knife. Id. In 1971, he killed a young woman with a
knife and was later found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to the state mental health
hospital. Id. The murderer was released in April of 1976 from the hospital, and one year later
killed Bowers, also with a knife. Id.
66 Id. at 618.
67 Id. (citing Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 404-05 (5th Cir. 1961)).
"8 Id.
69 1d. In finding that the state had no federal constitutional duty to protect its citizens, the
Bowers court reasoned that "the Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the states to
let people alone; it does not require the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as
maintaining law and order." Id.
7° Id. at 618, 619.
71 Id. at 618. The Bowers court stated
Iwie do not want to pretend that the line between	 inflicting and failing to prevent
the infliction of harm, is clearer than it is. If the state puts a man in a position of
danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say
that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown
hint into a snake pit.
Id.
' 2 Id. (citing Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974)).
" Id.
74 The Seventh Circuit went on to state that although the failure of the state to protect Bowers
violated no federal constitutional duty, and thus was not actionable under § 1983, that failure may
have provided a cause of action under the state common law. Id. The court noted that "[t]he
tendency in the common law has been to impose ever greater liability on officials who negligently
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One year after the Bowers decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Fox v.
Custis75 also indicated that the state has a duty to protect individuals not incarcerated
nor in its custody or care. In Fox, a parolee named Mason set fire to Fox's home and
committed various other crimes of violence shortly after the parolee's release from a
Virginia prison. 76 Prior to committing these crimes, Mason had committed several parole
violations, for which his parole could have been revoked, yet he was allowed to remain
free. 77 Fox and the other victims of Mason's violence filed suit, pursuant to section 1983,
against two members of the state Department of Corrections who had been assigned to
supervise Mason. 78 The plaintiffs alleged that the parole officers' actions in failing to
reincarcerate Mason deprived them of their constitutionally protected rights without
due process of law."
The Fourth Circuit stated that the fourteenth amendment right not to be deprived
of liberty without due process of law does not impose a general duty upon the state to
protect individuals from dangerous persons." The majority noted, however, that a duty
fail to protect the public from dangerous criminals and lunatics." Id. at 618-19 (citing Homere v.
State, 48 A. D.2d 422, 370 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1975); Leverett v. State, 61 Ohio App. 2d 35, 40, 41, 399
N.E.2d 106, 109-10 (1978); Williams v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1040, 1044-45 (D.S.D. 1978).
But see Cady v. State, 129 Ariz. 258, 630 P.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1981)). The Bowers court chose not to
express any view on the rights of the plaintiff under the Illinois tort law. Id. at 619. For a discussion
of possible causes of action under state tort law against the state for failing to provide protection,
see infra note 217. •
" 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983).
76 Id. at 85-86. Mason had been convicted in 1976 of arson and grand larceny and sentenced
to a term of twenty years in the state penitentiary, with ten years suspended. Id. at 86. He was
paroled on April 12, 1978. Id. at 85. On May 14, 1978, Mason set fire to Fox's home, raped, beat,
and set on fire Lisa Morris, and shot and stabbed Wendy Morris. Id. at 86.
" Id. On May 8, 1978, less than one month after his parole, Mason was convicted of defrauding
an innkeeper and given a 30-day suspended sentence. Id. The officers assigned to supervise Mason
were aware of this conviction and considered it a parole violation, yet they did not revoke his
parole. Id. The parole officers also had information that on May 1, 1978, Mason had committed
an arson which resulted in one death, yet they still did not revoke his parole. Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. The plaintiff's filed the Section 1983 claims in the Circuit Court of Northampton County,
Virginia. Id. In addition to the claims brought pursuant to Section 1983, the plaintiffs also brought
separate claims under the tort law of the state of Virginia. Id. The state law claims asserted that
Section 53-250(4) of the Virginia Code required the parole officers to reincarcerate Mason once
they became aware of a parole violation and that the officers' negligent failure to perform this duty
was the cause of the injuries suffered. Id. The defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, removed
the actions to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. at 84, 86. The
district court dismissed the case, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Id. at 86.
8() Id. at 88. Before discussing the state's duty to provide protection, the Fourth Circuit stated
that if it were to decide the case on the basis of the factors deemed relevant by the Supreme Court
in Martinez, it would conclude that the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs were too remote a
consequence of the parole officers' actions to constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights under
section 1983. Id. at 87. For a discussion of Martinez, see supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
The Fox court noted, however, that the facts presented a much closer question on the issue of
causation than the facts present in Martinez. Fox, 712 F.2d at 87. The Fox majority noted that the
factors in this case made the cause and effect relationship between the state conduct and the
plaintiffs' injuries less attenuated than that in Martinez. The court stated that the cases were similar
in that "the defendants were unaware that the claimant-victims, as distinguished from the public at
large, faced any special danger." The court noted, however, that the cases differed in two arguably
important respects. First, the court stated, the time interval in Fox between the state conduct and
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upon the state to provide such protection may arise out of a special relationship between
an individual and the state. 81 The Fox court expressly chose not to attempt a general
definition of the type of special relationship which was necessary to give rise to a
constitutional right to be protected. 82 Instead, the majority found it sufficient to decide
the case before it by stating that no special relationship existed between the state and
the plaintiffs in Fox. 63 According to the court, the plaintiffs were simply members of the
general public, and the parole officers were not aware that the plaintiffs faced any special
dangers.s' Thus, the Fox court ruled that because the plaintiffs had no special relationship
with the state, the state had no federal constitutional duty to protect them. 8 s
In sum, the Supreme Court's decision in Martinez left open the possibility that the
fourteenth amendment could impose a duty upon the state to provide protection to an
individual from the actions of other private parties. Subsequent cases indicate that this
duty upon the state can arise if the state places an individual in a position of danger, or
if a "special relationship" exists between the state and a particular individual. Courts
have not, however, provided a comprehensive definition of the "special relationship"
necessary to give rise to the right to protection. 8" Consequently, the circumstances in
which an individual can claim a right to protection from the government under the
fourteenth amendment are not clear.
B. The Standard of Conduct Actionable Under Section 1983
A plaintiff in a section 1983 action who can establish successfully the constitutional
right to receive protection from the government next will have the burden of proving
that conduct on the part of governmental officials was the type of conduct necessary to
constitute a deprivation of that right. 87 The lower federal courts have disagreed over
the issue of what type of conduct on the part of government officials is necessary to state
a claim under section 1983 for the deprivation of fourteenth amendment due process
the injuries was much shorter than the five-month interval in Martinez. Second, the court stated,
the Fox defendants had responsibility for the parolee's supervision after he was released from
prison, unlike the situation in Martinez. Id. (citing Martinez, 444 U.S. at 280 n.2). Therefore, the
Fox court went on to address the question of whether the parole officers owed any constitutional
duty to protect the plaintiffs from the actions of the parolee. Id. at 88.
Id. As an example of the type of relationship which may give rise to a right to protection by
the state vindicable under Section 1983, the Fox court cited cases in which a duty arose towards
inmates in state prisons or patients in mental institutions whom the state knows to be under a
specific risk of harm from others. Id. (citing Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 849 (1980); Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1979); Woodhous v. Virginia, 487
F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973); ef Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101-03 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 929 (1981); see also Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Garin v. Delaware
State Hospital, 543 F. Supp. 268, 272 (D.Del. 1982); Walker v. Rowe, 535 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. III.
1982)).
AY Id.
83 Id.
" Id.
' 5 Id. The Fox majority ruled that once it had dismissed the Section 1983 claim, the proper
course of action was to remand the state law claims to the state court for it to determine the
plaintiffs' rights to recover under state law grounds. Id. at 89-90.
86 See id. at 88.
" See Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
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rights." Some circuit courts of appeals have stated that merely negligent conduct on the
part of government officials is insufficient and that reckless or intentional conduct is
necessary in order to state such a claim."`' Other circuit courts, however, have found that
negligent conduct on the part of government officials can support a section 1983 cause
of action for the violation of due process rights. 9" In the 1986 cases of Daniels v.
and Davidson a. Cannon," the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this conflict among
the lower courts by holding that negligent conduct is insufficient to establish a violation
of the fourteenth amendment. The Court failed to set forth, however, what level of
conduct a plaintiff must prove in order to establish a claim for the deprivation of due
process rights.
In Daniels, a prison inmate allegedly sustained back and ankle injuries when he
slipped on a pillow that a correctional officer negligently had left on a stairway." The
inmate brought a section 1983 action against the correctional officer, alleging that the
officer's negligence deprived the inmate of his liberty interest in being free from bodily
injury in violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause."
The Daniels Court, in affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment for
the defendant, 95 ruled that negligent conduct on the part of government officials does
not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 96 Section 1983 itself,
the Court stated, does not prohibit recovery against state officials for negligent conduct."
The Court noted, however, that in order to recover in a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff
must prove the violation of an underlying constitutional right, and depending on the
right, negligent conduct alone may riot be sufficient to constitute a violation." The Court
stated that it historically has held that the fourteenth amendment due process clause
protects against deliberate governmental decisions to deprive individuals of life, liberty,
or property. 99 According to the Court, the due process clause was intended to protect
"s Compare Davidson v. Oionc, 752 F.2d 817, 826 (3d Cir. 1984) (negligence on part of state
officials does not state claim under Section 1983 for deprivation of due process), aff 'd sub nom.
Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986) with Howard v. Fortenberry, 723 F.2d 1206, 1209 n.6
(5th Cir. 1984) (negligence will suffice to state cause of action under Section 1983 for violation of
fourteenth amendment rights).
89 See, e.g., Davidson, 752 1 7.2d at 826, 828; Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337, 340 & n.2 (8th Cir.
1981).
90 See, e.g., McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1373 (10th Cir. 1984); Howard v. Fortensberry,
723 F.2d 1206, 1209 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984).
9' 106 S. Ct. 662, 664 (1986).
92 1 06 S. Ct. 668, 671 (1986).
"Daniels, 106 S. Ct.. at 663.
94 Id. See Ingraham 'v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (right to be free from unjustified
intrusions on personal security is one of historic liberties protected by fourteenth amendment).
" 748 F.2d 229 (1984), aff	 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
9i
 Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at (360.
92 Id. at 664.
9' Id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. De•, Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) ("invid-
ious discriminatory purpose required for claim of racial discrimination under the lelqual
1pirotection [c]lause"); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) ("'deliberate indifference' to
prisoner's serious illness or injury sufficient to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
[e]ighth [almendment")).
99 Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 665 (emphasis in original) (citing Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97
(1878); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Bell v. Burson. 402 U.S. 535 (197 I ); Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)).
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individuals from arbitrary abuses of power by the government.w° Negligent conduct,
the Court stated, suggests only the failure to conform to the conduct of a reasonable
person and does not amount to the deliberate abuse of power which the due process
clause historically has been applied to protect against." Therefore, the Court held that
negligent conduct does not implicate the fourteenth amendment due process clause.'"
The Daniels Court, however, expressly left open the question of whether something less
than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence, was sufficient to invoke
the protections of the due process clause.'"
In the companion case, of Davidson v. Cannon,'" the Court again did not resolve the
issue of whether less than intentional conduct on the part of state officials resulting in
personal injuries violates the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The Davidson
Court addressed a section 1983 claim by a prison inmate who alleged that prison officials
negligently failed to protect him from another inmate, thereby depriving him of liberty
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.'" The Court found that Daniels con-
trolled the outcome of the case and held that lack of due care does not constitute the
abusive governmental conduct which the due process clause is designed to protect
against.'" Justices Blackmun and Brennan filed dissenting opinions in Davidson,'°7 how-
ever, stating that the actions of the prison officials in failing to protect the plaintiff may
have risen to the level of recklessness or deliberate indifference. The dissenting justices
found that reckless conduct on the part of state officials which causes personal injuries
does violate the due process clause.'" The majority in Davidson, however, did not address
the issue of whether reckless conduct could violate the fourteenth amendment, stating
that the plaintiff only had alleged negligent conduct on the part of the corrections
officers. 15"
The Daniels and Davidson decisions establish that negligent conduct on the part of
state officials who fail to protect an individual will not amount to a violation of the
fourteenth amendment and hence, will not result in liability under section 1983."° The
decisions, however, do not resolve completely the question of what level of conduct on
the part of state officials a plaintiff must prove in order to establish a claim for the
deprivation of due process rights. The Court expressly left open the issue of whether
something less than intentional conduct, such as gross negligence or recklessness, on the
part of state officials who fail to protect individuals to whom such a duty is owed violates
the fourteenth amendment due process clause.'"
'"'° Id.
Lot m.
1 °2 Id. at 666.
'OS Id. at 667 n.3.
104
 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
' 1)5 Id. at 669.
' 66 Id. at 670, 671.
107 Id, at 671 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 671-72 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1 °8 Id. at 671 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun,
who was joined by Justice Marshall, rejected the majority's position that negligent conduct by state
officials could never violate the due process clause. Id. at 673 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent
stated that in some cases the Court could find governmental negligence amounts to the abuse of
power required to implicate the due process clause. Id.
,°° Id. at 670.
"° Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 666; Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 671.
'" Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 667 n.3.
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C. Immunity from Section 1983 Liability
Even if a plaintiff establishes the existence of a state's constitutional duty to protect
an individual and proves governmental conduct which constitutes a constitutional de-
privation, immunity doctrines nevertheless may prevent a plaintiff from imposing liability
on the government or its officials under section 1983.' 12 The Supreme Court has held
consistently that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from
personal liability under section 1983 in order to protect them from "undue interference
with their duties and potentially disabling threats of liability.""g The Court's decisions
have recognized immunities of two varying scopes: qualified immunity and absolute
immunity. 14
Most public officials who perform discretionary functions are protected from per-
sonal liability by the defense of qualified immunity, under which they will not be held
liable for unconstitutional conduct if their actions are taken in good faith.'" Under the
standard enunciated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald," 6 courts measure the good faith of govern-
ment officials by whether or not their conduct violated clearly established rights of which
a reasonable person would have been aware. Thus, the defense of qualified immunity
will protect government officials from personal liability under section 1983 if their
conduct does not violate clearly established federal constitutional or statutory rights." 7
The rationale for providing public officials with the defense of qualified immunity is
based on two public policy concerns. First, the defense seeks to avoid the injustice of
subjecting officials who are required to exercise discretion to personal liability for actions
taken in good faith." 9 Second, the defense seeks to eliminate the danger that potential
liability will deter officials from performing their duties with the judgment and decisive-
ness that their duties require." 9 The Supreme Court has held that the protection of
qualified immunity applies to various public officials, including police officers, 19° state
prison officials, 12 ' state governors,'" the president of a state university,'" members of
the state national guard, 124 public school officials,'" school board members,' 26 and the
superintendent of a state hospital.'"
112 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976).
12 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). The Harlow case, in which the Court
identified the standard for determining whether an official is protected by qualified immunity,
involved a claim for damages against federal executive officials for the deprivation of constitutional
rights and thus did not involve a Section 1983 action. Id. at 802, 818. The Court noted, however,
that the standard for determining the applicability of qualified immunity would not differ in a
Section 1983 action. Id. at 818 n.30 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
"'Harlow, 457 U.S at 807.
15 See id. at 818.
"6 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).
" 7 Id.
" 6 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654 (1980) (citing Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 240 (1974)).
"5 Id.
' 20 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
' 2 ' Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978).
122 Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 234, 250 (1974).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
126 Id.
127 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 564, 577 (1975).
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Although the defense of qualified immunity will protect public officials exercising
discretion from personal liability, local governmental units sued for the actions of its
officials do not enjoy such protection.' 28 A local government may be subjected to suit
under section 1983 when its employees inflict constitutional deprivations while carrying
out the official policies or practices of the government. 129 In Owen v. City of Independence,'"
the Supreme Court ruled that the city was not entitled to claim the defense of qualified
immunity for the good faith constitutional violations of its employees. The Court noted
that the injustice in holding public officials personally liable for good faith constitutional
violations did not apply with the same force when the defendant was the government.' 3 '
The Court found that where public officials could not have foreseen that their actions
in carrying out government policies would be found to deprive persons of constitutional
rights, it was fairer to allocate any resulting financial loss to the costs of government, as
borne by all the taxpayers, rather than to the individual who had been wronged. 1" In
addition to finding a lack of unfairness in holding the government liable for good faith
constitutional violations, the Court found that potential liability for policies which might
later be found to violate the Constitution would encourage government policy makers
to show greater concern to enact policies which comport with the Constitution.'" Thus,
the Court held that the public policy reasons which justified granting qualified immunity
from personal liability to public officials did not justify granting such protection from
section 1983 liability to local governuients. 131
In addition to the protection of qualified immunity available to officials exercising
discretion, courts have granted absolute immunity to public officials who, for reasons of
public policy, require complete protection from damage suits.' 35 In Imbler v. Pachtman, 196
128 See Owen, 445 U.S. at 657. The eleventh amendment prohibits suits in federal courts against
states and agencies which are "arms of the state." See Nit. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). The eleventh amendment bar, however, does not extend to suits
in federal court against municipal corporations, counties, and their agencies. Id. (citing Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1874); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-21
(1973)).
' 29 Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In Mandl, the
Supreme Court ruled that local governments may not be subjected to suit under Section 1983 on
a respondeat superior theory. Id. Under this theory, courts deem an employer responsible for the
actions of its employees committed within the scope of their duties. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE
LAW or TORTS, § 69-70 (5th ed. 1984). The employer's liability under the respondeat superior
theory is not based on any fault on the part of the employer but rather, is based solely on the
existence of the employment relationship. Id. In order to establish the liability of a local government
under Section 1983, however, a plaintiff' will have to prove that the complained-of injuries resulted
from the employee's execution of an official policy of the government. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
1 " 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
See id. at 654-55.
'n Id. at 655.
l" Id. at 656.
154 Id. at 652-53. The Owen Court found only that municipalities were not entitled to qualified
immunity protection from Section 1983 suits. Id. at 657. However, courts have interpreted the Owen
decision regarding the scope of governmental immunity under Section 1983 as applying to other
governmental units as well, including counties and their agencies. See Wagner v. Genesee County
Bd. of Comm'rs, 607 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 558 F.
Supp. 1093 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
," See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508
(1978); lmbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-28 (1976).
156
 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
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for example, the Supreme Court granted prosecuting attorneys the protection of absolute
immunity for actions taken within their prosecutorial functions. The Court noted that
prosecutors must exercise their best judgment in determining which prosecutions to
initiate and how to conduct those prosecutions in court.' 37 The threat of potential liability,
the Court found, would constrain prosecutors in making these decisions.'" The Court
also stated that without absolute immunity, prosecutors could expect suits for damages
to be brought against them with frequency by defendants who resent the prosecutor's
decision to prosecute them.'" Such frequency of potential suits, the Court found, would
divert the prosecutor's energy and attention from the important duty of enforcing the
criminal law. In addition, the Court pointed out that because prosecutors frequently act
under serious constraints of time and information, many of their decisions may give rise
to colorable claims of constitutional deprivations. Defending those claims, the Court
stated, would impose intolerable burdens on prosecutors who are responsible for
hundreds of indictments and trials during the course of a year. 14° Furthermore, the
Court stated, although affording prosecutors absolute immunity would deny compen-
sation to an individual wronged by a prosecutor, the greater needs of the general public
in having an effective criminal justice system justified such a result.' 4 ' For these reasons,
the Court found that the threat of potential liability in the absence of absolute immunity
would deter prosecutors from effectively performing their duties, which are essential to
the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. 142 Therefore, the Court held that
prosecutors require the protection of absolute immunity from suit.' 43
For similar public policy reasons, the Court in Butz v. Economou' 44 extended the
protection of absolute immunity to federal agency officials who, in determining whether
or not to initiate administrative proceedings, perform duties analogous to those of a
137 Id. at 424.
135 Id. at 424-25.
139 Id. at 425.
' 4° Id. at 425-26.
' 4 ' Id. at 427.
' 42 Id. at 427-28.
' 4 ' Id. at 427. The Imbler Court emphasized that granting absolute immunity from civil damages
does not leave the public powerless to deter official misconduct. Id. at 428-29. The Court stated
that even if protected by absolute immunity from civil damages under Section 1983, public officials
still could be subjected to criminal sanctions for willful deprivations of constitutional rights pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 242. Id. at 429. That statute provides:
Whoever, under color of any state law ... subjects any 	 [person] to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States shall be fined not more than $1000.00 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term
of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982).
The Court in Imbler also stated that the duties of a prosecutor also involve actions before the
initiation of a prosecution and apart from the courtroom. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33. The majority
noted that in performing some of these duties, the prosecutor acts as an administrator rather than
as an officer of the court and that drawing a fine between these functions might present difficulties.
Id. Other courts have relied on this language in holding that prosecutors acting in an administrative
or investigative capacity are not entitled to absolute immunity but can claim only a qualified
immunity from damage suits. See, e.g., Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 975 (5th Cir. 1983);
McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d 990, 993
(3d Cir. 1980).
144. 438 U.S. 478, 515-16 (1978).
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piosecutor. Courts also have extended absolute immunity to various other public officials,
including legislators, 145
 judges, 149
 and officials whose functions constitute integral parts
of the judicial process. 147
Courts have answered inconsistently the question of whether the government may
claim the protection of absolute immunity from liability for the acts of its officials who
are protected by that defense. 343
 Although the Supreme Court's decision in Owen 199
established that local governments are not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity,
the decision did not address the issue of the government's ability to claim the protection
of absolute immunity for acts of its officials who are so protected)" Some lower courts
that have addressed this issue have concluded that local governments cannot claim
absolute immunity from suit even when their employees have been found to be entitled
to absolute immunity from personal liability."' In Wagner v. Genesee County Board of
Commissioners,' 52
 for example, the Michigan federal district court held that the govern-
ment could not claim the defense of absolute immunity from suit for the actions of its
officials who were protected from personal liability by that defense. The district court
in Wagner first concluded that the officials were absolutely immune from personal liability
under section 1983 in connection with activities which were within the scope of their
duties. 153
 The court then ruled, however, that the governmental unit which employed
' 45
 Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 406 (1979) (regional
legislators); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312 (1973) (federal legislators); Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (state legislators).
146 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 555 (1967).
147 See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335, 345-46 (1983) (police officers testifying as
witnesses); Walden v. Wishengrad, 745 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1984) (Department of Social Services
attorney who initiates and prosecutes child protective orders); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456,
1458 (fith Cir. 1984) (Department of Social Services employees who initiate proceedings to terminate
parental rights); Wagner v. Genesee County Board of Commissioners, 607 F. Supp. 1158, 1164-
65 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (Friend of the Court employees seeking an order of attachment for non-
payment of child support); Boyer v. Spero, No. 84—CV-219 (N.D.N.Y. July 2, 1985) (social workers
in the post-investigative stages of child protection proceedings); Pepper v. Alexander, 599 F. Supp.
523, 526 (D.N.M. 1984) (Department of Human Services employees in the filing of an application
for the termination of parental rights); Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093, 1098-
99 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (social services workers acting in the course of their duties in child protection
proceedings).
148 Compare Wagner, 607 F. Supp. at 1 167 (government cannot claim absolute immunity defense)
with Whelehan, 558 F. Supp. at 1108 (government entitled to claim absolute immunity defense).
See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of Owen.	 .
' 5° Wagner, 607 F. Supp. at 1167; Armstead v. Town of Harrison, 579 F. Supp, 777, 782
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Whelehan, 558 F. Supp. at 1104.
151 See, e.g., Wagner, 607 F. Supp. at 1167. See also Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home
Village,. 723 F.2d 675, 680, 681 (9th Cir. 1984) (local government entitled to no immunity from
suit for acts of its prosecutors who were absolutely immune from personal liability); Reed v. City
of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 953 (7th Cir. 1983) (municipality's liability extends to official acts of
municipal policy makers even though officials themselves might enjoy absolute immunity from
personal liability).
152 607 F. Supp. 1158, 1170 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
153
	 at 1164, 1165. The individual officials were acting within the scope of their duties in
seeking an order of attachment for failure to make child support payments. Id. at 1164. The Wagner
court found that the actions of these officials were integral parts of the judicial process in the
enforcement of court-ordered child support payments and thus were entitled to absolute immunity
from personal liability. Id. at 1164, 1165.
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the officials — the county — could not claim the protection of absolute immunity)" The
Wagner court stated that, as the Supreme Court had found in Owen, requiring the
government to compensate individuals for wrongs it has committed is not unjust. 155 In
addition, the Wagner court noted, the threat of governmental liability will not deter the
exercise of judgment and instead may lead to more careful decision-making on the part
of governmental policy makers.IG Therefore, the Wagner court concluded that the county
was not entitled to absolute immunity from section 1983 liability.' 57
Other courts, however, have found that local governments are entitled to the defense
of absolute immunity from suit for actions of its officials who are so protected) 58 In
Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 159 for example, parents of an allegedly abused child brought
a claim pursuant to section 1983 against the county of Monroe, the county Department
of Social Services, and various county employees for actions taken during an investigation
into the alleged sexual abuse of the child. The New York federal district court first held
that because the duties of the individual employees in child protection proceedings were
analogous to those of a prosecutor, the employees were entitled to the protection of
absolute immunity for actions taken within the scope of those duties.' 60 The court then
stated that for several public policy reasons, the governmental defendants — the County
and the County Department of Social Services — were absolutely immune from liability
for the actions of their employees within the scope of prosecutorial-type duties. 161 The
court stated that in the absence of absolute immunity, officials concerned with maintain-
ing the public treasury would be biased in favor of individual rights and that such bias
would interfere impermissibly with prosecutorial-type functions. 162 Therefore, the court
164 Id. at 1170.
1 " Id. at 1169,
156 Id. The Wagner court also found that the need to provide compensation to victims for wrongs
committed by the government outweighed any negative consequences which would result from
subjecting the government to liability for the acts of its officials in their quasi-judicial capacities. Id.
' 57 Id. at 1170.
'a9
	 e.g., Armistead, 579 F. Supp. at 782-83; Whelehan, 558 F. Supp. at 1108.
159 558 E. Supp. 1093, 1095-96 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). The plaintiffs, parents of the allegedly abused
child, asserted that the defendants made statements to the father's employer, the media, and various
governmental agencies concerning the father's supposed sexual conduct with his daughter. Id. at
1095. These statements allegedly were made with knowledge that they were false and with the
intention to harm the father's reputation and endanger his employment. Id. at 1095-96. The
plaintiffs also alleged that negligent investigatory practices resulted in the removal of the daughter
from the home and the father having to leave the home upon the daughter's return, thereby
depriving the parents and the child of their constitutional rights to maintain their family life. Id.
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that negligent investigatory practices resulted in the institution of
court proceedings in which the parents were charged with child abuse and neglect. Id. The plaintiffs
alleged that the state instituted this proceeding with knowledge that it was without merit, and thus
the proceeding constituted a deprivation of due process and a malicious prosecution. Id.
16° Id. at 1098-99. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515-16 (1978).
161 Whelehan,. 558 F. Supp. at 1105, 1108. The court, before addressing the question of the
government's ability to claim the defense of absolute immunity, dismissed the claims against the
government defendants because the complaint failed to allege sufficiently that the constitutional
deprivations resulted from the carrying out of official government policies. Id. at 1104. See also
supra note 129 and accompanying text. Thus, the court acknowledged that its discussion of the
scope of the government's immunity was °biter dictum. Whelehan, 558 F. Supp. at 1104. (emphasis
in original).
162 Whelehan, 558 F. Supp. at 1107. The Whelehan court also stated that if it did not grant
absolute immunity to the governmental defendants, the need for individual officials to attend
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found that the implications of subjecting the government to liability for the actions of
its officials in child protection proceedings justified granting absolute immunity to the
government as well as to the individual officials. 163
In summary, a plaintiff who can establish a deprivation of constitutional rights
nevertheless may be precluded from recovering damages under section 1983 by im-
munity doctrines. Most government officials who exercise discretion enjoy a qualified
immunity from personal liability for good faith constitutional violations. 164
 Courts have
granted certain officials, for public policy reasons, the greater protection of absolute
immunity from personal liability for constitutional violations, regardless of whether or
not their actions were taken in good faith. 165
 In addition, although the Supreme Court
has ruled that local governments may not claim the defense of qualified immunity for
good faith constitutional violations, 166
 some lower federal court decisions indicate that a
local government may be allowed to claim the protection of absolute immunity when it
is sued for the actions of an official who enjoys such protection.lo
IL THE RIGHT TO BE PROTECTED FROM CHILD ABUSE: THE CASES
A. Jensen v. Conrad
In the 1984 case of Jensen v. Conrad, 168
 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an abused child's right to receive protection by the state, grounded in the fourteenth
amendment, may arise upon the finding of a special relationship between the child and
the state. The Jensen court did not decide, however, whether a special relationship had
been created between either of the abused children and the state in the case before it. 169
Instead, the court determined that judicial recognition of the right to receive protection
by the state under the fourteenth amendment upon finding a special relationship had
not emerged until after the abused children in Jensen had died."0 Thus, because the
right to receive protection had not been "clearly established" at the time of the alleged
deprivations, the Jensen court held that the defendants — employees of the state and
county Department of Social Services — were entitled to the defense of qualified im-
munity and dismissed the claims."'
In Jensen, the estates of Sylvia Brown and Michael Clark, whose caretakers had
beaten them to death, filed separate actions in federal district courts.'" Both children
discovery and trial proceedings would frustrate society's compelling interest in protecting endan-
gered children. Id.
165 Id. at 1108. See also Armstead v. Town of Harrison, 579 F. Supp. 777, 782-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (for reasons of public policy, government defendant entitled to absolute immunity from
Section 1983 claim arising out of actions of its prosecutorial officials).
' 64
 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).
165 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
' 66
 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
167 See Armstead v. Town of Harrison, 579 F. Supp. 777, 782-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Whelehan
v. County of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093, 1108 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
168
 747 F.2d 185, 194 (4th Cir. 1984).
169 Id. at 194-95.
175 1d. at 194.
171 Id. at 194-95, 196. For a discussion of qualified immunity, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800 (1982). See also supra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
' 72 Jensen, 747 F.2d at 187.
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had died after reports of abuse concerning their families had been received and inves-
tigated by child protection agencies in South Carolina.'" With respect to Sylvia Brown,
the complaint alleged that Sylvia, then four months old, was admitted to the Richland
Memorial Hospital with a fractured skull on February 28, 1979. 174 The attending phys-
ician suspected that Sylvia had been abused after a CAT scan' 75 revealed a healing
subdural hematoma.' 76 This suspicion was confirmed after Mrs. Brown and her boy-
friend visited Sylvia at the hospital."7 During the visit, Mrs. Brown's boyfriend reportedly
held Sylvia by the head and neck and slapped her roughly.
The following week, a hospital social worker filed a report of suspected abuse on
Sylvia's behalf with the Richland County Department of Social Services. An investigation
was conducted, and the Department reached an agreement which required Sylvia and
her mother, Mrs. Brown, to live at the home of Sylvia's grandmother. According to the
agreement, Sylvia was to be placed in the custody of the Department if Mrs. Brown and
Sylvia returned to live in their own home.'" Despite the mandates of the agreement,
Sylvia and her mother returned to their own home, and Sylvia was not taken into the
custody of the Department. 179 On May 11, 1979, Sylvia died as the result of brain
hemorrhaging, and her mother later pleaded guilty to a charge of involuntary man-
slaughter in connection with her death.
With respect to Michael Clark, the complaint alleged that on February 28, 1980, the
Anderson County Department of Social Services received a report of suspected abuse
concerning Michael's older brother. While investigating the report, a caseworker from
the Department met with Michael's brother, observed bruises about the child's face, and
was told by the child that his father had hit him on several occasions. The caseworker
repeatedly attempted to locate the Clark family but was unsuccessful in doing so. 1 '111 After
sixty days, the Department classified the report of abuse as unfounded and officially
closed the investigation. On June 23, 1980, three-year-old Michael was beaten to death
by his mother's boyfriend, who subsequently was convicted of the child's murder.
The estates of Sylvia Brown and Michael Clark brought suits in different federal
district courts, 181 pursuant to section 1983, against employees of the state and county
175 Id. at 187, 188.
1 " Id. at 187.
1 " CAT scan is the abbreviation for "computerized axial tomography." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY: 5TH UNABRIDGED LAWYER'S EDITION (1982). It is defined as "the gathering of anatom-
ical information from a cross-sectional plane of the body, presented as an image generated by a
computer synthesis of x-ray transmission data obtained in many different directions through the
given plane." Id.
Jensen, 747 F.2d at 187. A subdural hematoma is a mass of blood, usually clotted, located
beneath the outer surface of the brain. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY: 5TH UNABRIDGED LAWYER'S
EDITION (1982).
L ." Jensen, 747 F.2d at 187.
" I' Id. at 187-88.
179 Id. at 188.
"ft) Id. The Clarks did not answer letters and telephone calls and several visits to various
addresses failed to locate the Clark family.
il" The estate of Sylvia Brown filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, Columbia Division. See Jensen v. Conrad, 570 F. Supp. 91 (D.S.C. 1983), aff'd, 747
F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1754 (1985). The estate of Michael Clark filed suit
in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Anderson Division. See Jensen
v. Conrad, 570 F. Supp. 114 (D.S.C. 1983), aff'd, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.
1754 (1985).
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Departments of Social Services. 182
 The plaintiffs alleged that the children possessed a
constitutional right, guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, to receive protection by
the state from harm inflicted by their caretakers and that the failure of the state to
prevent the children from being abused deprived them of this right.'" In the Brown
case, the district court held that the child protection agency had no constitutional duty
to protect Sylvia and therefore dismissed the complaint.'" In the Clark case, the district
court found that when an individual is legally entrusted to the care or protection of
government officials, the failure to protect that individual could constitute a deprivation
of life without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 1 s5 The
court held, however, that because case law had not clearly established this right to receive
protection, the defendants were entitled to raise the defense of governmental immu-
nity, 186
 and the court granted summary judgment in their favor.'"
The estates of the deceased children appealed the decisions of the district courts to
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, and the two cases were consolidated for appeal.'"
The Jensen majority began its analysis by stating that the first inquiry in any section 1983
suit is to determine whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.'" The plaintiffs alleged that the failure of the
child protection system to intervene and protect the children from their parents' abuse
deprived the children of liberty rights secured by the fourteenth amendment due process
clause.'" In determining whether the children possessed such a right to protection, the
Fourth Circuit first examined the line of cases beginning in 1976 with Estelle v. Gamble 19 '
and culminating in 1983 with Fox v. Custis. 192
 The court concluded that these cases
'"s
	 747 F.2d at 187. The complaints named as defendants the Commissioner of the
South Carolina Department of Social Services, members of the State Board of the Department of
Social Services, members of the board of the Richland and Anderson County Departments of Social
Services, and various state-employed caseworkers. Id.
'D 3 Id. at 190.
1 e' Id. at 189-90. The district court in the Brown case held that the fourteenth amendment only
created a right to receive protection from the state when the individual claiming the right was in
the state's legal custody or under its direct supervisory control. Id. Because the complaint did not
allege that the state had assumed custody or direct supervisory control of Sylvia Brown, the district
court held that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and dismissed
the suit. Id. at 190.
"5 Id. at 189.
L " See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818 (1981) (government officials performing discre-
tionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights).
187 fensen, 747 F.2d at 189. The district court's granting of summary judgment for the defen-
dants in the Clark case did not cover the individual caseworkers. Id. at 187 n.l. The district court
found that it was impossible to determine from the complaint which of the caseworkers were
personally involved in the investigation concerning the Clark family. Id. Thus, the district court
granted the plaintiff additional time to file a more detailed complaint concerning the individual
involvement of the caseworkers. Id. Therefore, because the district court had not yet entered a final
judgment as to the claims against the individual caseworkers, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the
appeal by the caseworkers. Id.
' 88
 Id. at 187.
189 1d. at 190 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,140 (1979)).
' 9° Id.
19 ' 429 U.S. 97 (1976). For a discussion of Estelle, see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying
text.
' 92 fensen, 747 F.2d at 190-94. For a discussion of Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983),
see supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
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established an individual's right to receive the state's protection, founded in the four-
teenth amendment, if a special relationship exists between the state and the individual
claiming the right.'"
Having determined that a constitutional right to receive protection by the state could
exist, the Jensen majority next addressed the question of whether the representatives of
the deceased children properly could claim that right in the present case. 19' While
recognizing that the Fox decision firmly established the fourteenth amendment right to
receive protection upon the finding of a special relationship, the Jensen court stated that
the deaths of the abused children occurred before the Fox case was decided.'" Thus,
the Jensen court found that the defendants could not reasonably have been expected to
know that their failure to protect the children from abuse could violate the fourteenth
amendment.' 96 The Jensen majority stated that even if the defendants could have foreseen
the Fox court's holding that a constitutional duty to provide protection can arise given a
special relationship, it was not clear that the defendants could have foreseen that special
relationships had existed between the state and the abused children in the cases pre-
sented.'97 The court noted that because of the absence of specific guidelines to determine
what constitutes a special relationship and the "close" nature of the facts in the present
cases, "[it] would be hard-pressed to conclude that the law as it affected the defendants
was 'clearly established." 96 The court determined, therefore, that the defendants were
entitled to the defense of qualified immunity under the standard set forth by the
Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 199 in which public officials will not be held liable
if the law was not clearly established at the time of the alleged wrongdoing. 20° Accord-
ingly, the Jensen court found that the complaints should be dismissed. 20 '
Because the Jensen court dismissed the claims on the basis of qualified immunity, it
did not provide a definition of the type of special relationship necessary to give rise to
the right of protection. 2" In addition, the court did not decide whether a special rela-
tionship had been created between the state and either of the abused children in Jensen. 202
The court did identify, however, three factors that it would look to in assessing whether
or not a special relationship existed between the state and an individual claiming the
right to protection. 204 The first factor which the court identified was whether the victim
or the perpetrator of the incident was in the legal custody of the state at the time of the
incident or prior to it. 206 In the Jensen case, the court stated, the children and their
parents who abused them were not in the custody of the state but instead, were members
193 Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194. For a discussion of the historical development of the right to receive
protection by the state, see supra notes 29-86 and accompanying text.
' 94 Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194.
192 Id.
I" Id. at 195.
' 22 Id. at 194.
192 Id.
' 99 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
2°°Jensen, 747 F.2d at 195. For a discussion of governmental immunities in Section 1983 suits,
see supra notes 112-67 and accompanying text.
"' Jensen, 747 F.2d at 196.
2°2 Id. at 194 n.11.
20' Id. at 194-95.
204
	 at 194 n.11.
2°s
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of the general public. 206 This fact, according to the Jensen majority, weighed against the
finding of a special relationship. 207
The second factor identified by theJensen court was whether the state had expressly
stated its desire to provide protection to a particular class of specific individuals. 206 The
court stated that the preamble of the South Carolina Child Protection Act clearly ex-
pressed a desire to locate and protect potentially abused children. 209 Nevertheless, the
court stated that this factor did not argue convincingly for or against the finding of a
special relationship in the Jensen case.")
The third factor which the Jensen court identified as important in a special relation-
ship analysis was whether the state knew of the plight of the victim. 2 " The court found
there was some evidence in the Jensen case that the state knew the children were being
abused.212 The court stated that this factor therefore strengthened the argument that a
special relationship had been established. 213 The court concluded that although it had
no need to decide whether special relationships had been created between the state and
the deceased children, the factors present in the cases before it would make the resolution
of that question a particularly close one. 21
In concluding its analysis, the Fourth Circuit in Jensen recognized that its decision
left the plaintiffs without a remedy in the federal courts- 2 ' 3 The court noted, however,
that the plaintiffs still had several causes of action available to them in state court. 216
Although declining to express a view as to the. plaintiffs' rights under the tort law of
South Carolina, the Jensen court observed that the growing tendency in the common law
has been to hold government officials liable for failing to protect the public from
"dangerous criminals and lunatics." 2"
206 Id.
20 Id,
2°8 Id. at 195 n.I I.
203 Id. The South Carolina Child Protection Act provides, in part: "recognizing that abused and
neglected children need protection, it is the purpose of this article to save them from injury and
harm ...." S.C. Cons: ANN. § 20-7-480 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
21°
 Despite the preamble of the South Carolina Protection Act, the Jensen court found it "difficult
to conclude that the state intended to 'single out' the decedents and place them in its own care" as
the state had done with prisoners whom it had incarcerated. Jensen, 747 F.2d at 195 n.11.
2 "Jensen, 747 F.2d at 195 n.11,
212 Id.
213 id.
2 " Id. at 194 n.11. Judge Murnaghan, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the majority's
holding that the defendants were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. Id. at 196 (Mur-
naghan, J., concurring). He disassociated himself, however, from the majority opinion's finding
that the plaintiffs had established a special relationship between the deceased children and the child
protection agencies. Id, Judge Murnaghan stated that because of the importance of the right of
parents to control the destiny of their children, the Supreme Court might decide that the consti-
tution imposes no duty on the states to protect abused children from the violence of their parents.
Id. Stating that the question of whether the state has such a constitutional duty is not an easy one
to resolve, Judge Murnaghan found that the issue was unnecessary to the resolution of this case.
Id. Judge Murnaghan reasoned that whether or not a duty to protect abused children exists, such
a duty was not established clearly at the time of the deprivations in this case. Id.
216 Id. at 196.
21° Id.
Id. (citing Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)). An in-depth discussion of
the liability of the government and its workers based on state tort law for failing to protect members
of the general public is beyond the scope of this article. The plaintiffs in Jensen, however, probably
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B. Estate of Bailey v. County of York
In the 1985 case Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 218 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed a section 1983 claim filed by the estate of a deceased child whO had
been beaten to death by her mother and her mother's boyfriend. The estate alleged that
the county child protection agency which had investigated a report of the child's abuse
had, in failing to protect the child, deprived her of rights guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.2 I 9 The Third Circuit held that the complaint stated a proper cause of action
against the county under section 1983.220 The court found that based on the allegations
of the complaint, a special relationship had been created between the abused child and
the county child protection agency, thus giving rise to a constitutional duty upon the
county to protect the child. 221 Therefore, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of the claim and remanded the case to the district court to give the plaintiffs
an opportunity to prove their allegations. 222
In Bailey, the complaint alleged that on January 11, 1982, relatives filed reports of
suspected abuse concerning five-year-old Aleta Bailey, who lived with her mother and
her mother's boyfriend, Larry Hake.223 The following day an employee of the county
child protection agency took Aleta to the hospital, where a physician confirmed that
Hake had abused Aleta. 224 That day, Aleta was released from the hospital and placed
with her mother's aunt. Aleta's mother was informed by the child protection worker that
she had twenty-four hours to make arrangements for Hake to move from her home and
that thereafter Aleta would be returned to her custody. The following night, Aleta was
could not have maintained a successful claim under South Carolina tort law. Traditional common
law doctrines of governmental immunity have prevented states, as well as state agencies and political
subdivisions, from being subjected to civil suits without the consent of the state. W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 131 (5th ed, 1984). Although these immunity doctrines have
been abrogated to a great extent in many states, see id., South Carolina continues to hold govern-
mental units immune from civil damage actions, subject to a few narrow exceptions. See Belue v.
City of Spartanburg, 276 S.C. 381,280 S.E.2d 49 (1981). Furthermore, even in jurisdictions where
governmental immunities have been largely abrogated, many jurisdictions have retained the im-
munities for discretionary actions of the government. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON ON THE LAW OF
Tom's, § 131 (5th ed. 1984).
In addition to the immunity of governmental units, public officials have traditionally been
protected from personal liability by varying scopes of immunity for discretionary, as opposed to
ministerial, functions. Id. at § 132. A court construing the duties of child protection employees in
determining what actions to take in child abuse proceedings likely would find these duties discre-
tionary in nature. See Jensen, 747 F.2d at 189. The South Carolina Child Protection Act provides
that local child protection agencies may petition for court intervention on behalf of abused children
if the agency deems it necessary, but the Act does not expressly require the agency to intervene.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-6500. Therefore, it would appear that South Carolina tort law would
have foreclosed the plaintiffs in Jensen from recovery against both the government and individual
defendants.
"a 768 F.2d 503,505 (3d Cir. 1985).
210 Id.
225 Id. at 511.
221 Id. at 510-11.
222 1d. at 511.
229
	 at 505.
229 Id. The physician informed the child protection worker that Hake's actions in striking Aleta
had been excessive. Id. The physician also advised the worker that Hake should not have access to
Aleta,and that Aleta should be taken away from her mother if necessary to deny Hake access to
her. Id.
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returned to her mother, and one month later she died from physical injuries that were
inflicted by her mother and Hake. 225
The administrator of Aleta's estate and Aleta's father brought suit in federal district
court in Pennsylvania, pursuant to section 1983. 226 The plaintiffs alleged that defective
policies and procedures used by the county child protection agency resulted in Aleta's
death, thereby depriving Aleta of her right to life and Aleta's father of his right to
parenthood.227 The district court found that the state can be held liable for unconstitu-
tional conduct resulting from omissions only if a person suffers injuries while in the
legal custody of the state or if the person whose conduct causes the injuries is under the
direct control or supervision of the state.228 Therefore, the district court found that the
complaint did not state a cause of action and dismissed the case. 229 The plaintiffs appealed
the district court's dismissal of the claim to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals."°
In analyzing the claim, the first question addressed by the Third Circuit was whether
the allegations of the complaint were sufficient, if proven, to meet the threshold require-
ments necessary to impose liability upon the county under section 1983. 231 The court
noted that a municipality may not be held liable in a section 1983 action for injuries
inflicted by its agents or employees on a respondeat superior theory.232 The Bailey court
stated that a municipality may be subjected to such a suit, however, when the injuries
complained of are inflicted through the carrying out of the municipality's official poll-
cies. 253 According to the Bailey court, the complaint alleged that Aleta Bailey died as a
result of the county child protection agency's defective policies and procedures. 234 The
court held that some of the policies and procedures alleged in the complaint, if proven,
were sufficiently connected to the alleged constitutional deprivations to support a section
1983 claim against the county. 235 These policies, the Bailey court stated, included not
seeking court intervention in cases involving serious child abuse where only one incident
of such abuse existed, giving families of suspected abuse victims advance notice of home
visits, not checking the observations of independent witnesses, and failing to notify
natural parents of the nature and extent of child abuse. 236 Thus, the Third Circuit held
that the complaint, in alleging defective policies and practices of the county child pro-
228 Id. Hake was convicted of first degree murder and Aleta's mother was convicted of third
degree murder in connection with the child's death. Id. at 505 n.l.
226 See Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 580 F. Supp. 794 (M.D. Pa. 1984), read., 768 F.2d
503 (3d Cir. 1985).
227 580 F. Supp. at 795.
228 Id. at 797. The district court found that because Aleta was not in the state's custody when
she was killed, nor were her mother and Hake under the direct control or supervision of the state,
the state could not be held responsible for Aleta's death. Id.
2" Id. The defendants also filed motions to dismiss on the basis of immunity from suit under
Section 1983. Id. at 795. Because the district court dismissed the action on the basis that the plaintiffs
had not alleged sufficiently a Section 1983 claim, it found no need to address the immunity claims.
Id. at 797.
8" See Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985).
231 See id. at 506-08.
232 For a discussion of respondeat superior, see supra note 129.
299
	
768 F.2d at 506 (citing Monell v. New York City Dept of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
694 (1978)).
254 Id.
235 Id.
2'6
	
at 507 n.4.
September 19861	 CHILD ABUSE	 973
tection agency as the cause of the complained-of injuries, met the threshold requirement
necessary to impose liability on the county under section 1983.227
The next issue addressed by the Bailey majority was the standard of culpable conduct
necessary to be proved in order to support a section 1983 cause of action.232 The Third
Circuit stated that in order to meet the standard of conduct necessary to recover in a
section 1983 action, the complained-of conduct which causes the constitutional violation
alleged must rise to the level of gross negligence, deliberate indifference, or reckless
disregard. 239 The Bailey court found that the complaint, fairly read, alleged conduct by
the agency and its supervisory officials, in the form of defective policies and practices,
which amounted to gross negligence, deliberate indifference, or reckless disregard for
the safety of the abused child. 24° Thus, the Third Circuit held that the complaint alleged
the type of conduct on the part of state officials which is vindicable under section 1983. 24
The Bailey court went on to state, however, that although the complaint alleged the
necessary standard of conduct, the plaintiffs would have a difficult burden in proving
the existence of that conduct at tria1. 242 The court pointed out that an error in judgment,
an unforeseen tragic event, a good faith but misinformed professional decision, or mere
negligence, would not be sufficient to impose liability under section 1983. 245 Further-
more, the Third Circuit stated, to the extent that the plaintiffs relied on the policies of
the agency to impose liability, they would have to prove that the policieS were so far
below the accepted professional standards as to permit an inference that the agency was
recklessly indifferent to the safety of the child. 244
The Bailey majority next turned to the question of whether the child protection
agency owed any constitutional duty to provide protection to Aleta from the abuse
inflicted by her mother and her mother's boyfriend. 245 The court noted that the district
court had dismissed the claim by reasoning that because Aleta was not in the agency's
legal custody, the agency had no constitutional duty to protect her. 246 In reversing the
district court's decision, the court cited Jensen v. Canrad247 for the proposition that a right
to receive protection by the state could arise upon the finding of a special relationship
between the state and an individual and that such a right to protection was not limited
to situations where the individual claiming the right was in the state's custody. 242 The
2" Id. at 508. The Bailey court noted that the complaint also alleged that the constitutional
deprivations were caused by the actions of the administrator of the county child protection agency,
in her official capacity, in "establishing, accepting, and employing" the defective policies. Id. The
court pointed. out that a suit brought against an official in his or her official capacity is merely
another way of naming the entity that the official represents as the defendant, which in this case
was the county. Id. at 508 n.5 (citing Brandon v. •Holt, 105 S.Ct. 873, 878 n.21 (1985)).
233
	 at 508.
23v
	
For a discussion of the standard of state conduct necessary to be proven in order to
recover in a Section 1983 claim for the deprivation of fourteenth amendment due process rights,
see supra notes 87-111 and accompanying text.
240 Bailey,
 768 F.2d at 508.
241 Id,
242 Id.
243 Id.
244
24 ' Id. at 508-09.
2" Id. (citing Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 580 F. Supp. 794, 797 (M.D. Pa. 1984)).
24 ' 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1754 (1985).
243 Bailey, 768 F.2d at 509 (citing Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194). The Bailey majority traced the
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majority, although refusing to provide a general definition of the special relationship
necessary to give rise to the right of protection, held that based on the facts alleged in
the complaint, a special relationship had been created between the county child protec-
tion agency and Aleta. 249 The Third Circuit stated that there was evidence that the
county had notice that she was being abused and that the agency was aware that Aleta
faced special dangers not faced by the public at large. 25° When the agency knows that a
child has been abused, the Bailey court reasoned, the argument that a special relationship
has been established is strengthened. 251 Thus, the court held, based on the special
circumstances alleged in the complaint, the county owed a constitutional duty to Aleta
to protect her from child abuse. 252
The final issue addressed by the Bailey majority was causation. 253
 The court noted
that in Martinez v. Califonzia,254 the Supreme Court had dismissed the plaintiff's claim
on the basis that the injury complained of was too remote a consequence of the alleged
actions of the defendants to hold them liable under section 1983. 255 In distinguishing
Martinez, the Bailey court stated that the child protection agency was aware that Aleta,
as distinguished from the rest of the public, faced special dangers, whereas the defen-
dants in Martinez were unaware that the victim faced any special dangers. 256 Thus, the
Bailey majority held that it could not dismiss the complaint as a matter of law on causation
grounds. 257 Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that the complaint stated a proper
cause of action under section 1983 and remanded the case to the district court. 258
development of the notion that a duty of protection can arise upon the state based upon the finding
of a special relationship between the state and an individual. Id. at 510. For a discussion of this
development, see supra notes 29--86 and accompanying text.
242 Bailey, 768 F.2d at 511.
250 Id. at 510 (quoting Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,285 (1980)). In finding that a special
relationship had been established between the county child protection agency and Aleta Bailey, the
court noted several factors: the agency had notice that there was evidence of abuse, took Aleta into
custody, received confirmation of the abuse by a physician, placed Aleta into protective custody,
informed the child's mother that Aleta would be returned to her custody when she made arrange-
ments for her boyfriend to move from her home, and returned Aleta to her mother without
adequately investigating the whereabouts of the child, the mother, and the mother's boyfriend. Id.
221 Id. at 510-11 (quoting Jensen, 747 F.2d at 195 n.11).
252
	 at 511.
2" See id.
254 444 U.S. 277,285 (1980).
255
	 768 F.2d at 511. For a discussion of Martinez, see supra notes 50-56 and accompanying
text.
222 Bailey, 768 F.2d at 511.
227 Id. The Bailey majority noted that it had not addressed other legal defenses upon which the
district court had not ruled. Id. The defendants had filed a motion to dismiss in the district court
arguing that they were entitled to immunity. Bailey, 580 F. Supp. at 795. Because the district court
dismissed the action on the grounds that the defendants owed no constitutional duty to protect
Aleta from abuse, the district court did not rule on the immunity claim. Id. at 797. On remand to
the district court, the defendants would be free to raise the defense of immunity again.
222 Id. As of the writing of this note, the suit was still pending on remand to the Pennsylvania
district court.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Adams disagreed with the majority's view that the case was
distinguishable from Martinez. Id. at 511 (Adams, J., dissenting). The dissent found that the death
of Aleta Bailey was too remote a consequence of the actions of the child protection agency to hold
the defendants liable under section 1983. Id. at 513. Judge Adams stated that, as in Martinez,
substantial time had elapsed between the child protection agency's control of Aleta and her death,
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THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS WORKERS SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE FROM SUIT
FOR FAILING TO PREVENT CHILD ABUSE
As the decisions in Jensen v. Conrad?" and Estate of Bailey v. County of York26° indicate,
a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on the government and its child protection workers
for failing to protect children from abuse inflicted by their parents will face a heavy
burden in meeting the elements necessary to recover under section 1983. This heavy
burden is appropriate for plaintiffs seeking to recover for the government's failure to
prevent child abuse because the government and its workers should not be liable for
decisions, made in the face of incomplete and ambiguous information, which have the
unfortunate result of allowing a child to continue to be abused. The cases make dear,
however, that although a plaintiff will face a heavy burden, such a suit ultimately may
lead to damage awards against the government and child protection workers. The
potential liability of the government and its workers in these cases will result in several
negative practical consequences. Based on these negative consequences, the government
and its workers should, for public policy reasons, be absolutely immune from civil suit
for failing to prevent parents from abusing their children.
A. The Courts Have Not Provided Clear Guidance to Determine When The State Is Under a
Constitutional Duty to Protect Children from Child Abuse
Both the Jensen and Bailey courts accepted the proposition that although no general
duty upon the government exists under the fourteenth amendment to protect persons
from the actions of other private individuals, such a duty can arise given a special
relationship between the government and the individual claiming the right to protec-
tion. 261 Neither court, however, provided a comprehensive definition of the type of
special relationship necessary to give rise to the duty of protection. 262 Nevertheless, the
decisions do provide a framework for assessing when a court might find such a special
relationship and resulting duty of protection to exist between the government and an
abused child in future cases. Based on the Jensen and Bailey cases, two inquiries emerge
and Aleta was killed by two persons who were in no sense agents of the state. For these reasons,
Judge Adams believed that the decision in Martinez required the court to dismiss the complaint on
causation grounds. Judge Adams recognized that unlike the defendants in Martinez, the child
protection agency may have been aware that Meta faced dangers not faced by the members of the
public at large. Judge Adams stated, however, that he did not believe the steps taken by the child
protection agency created the sort of special relationship that might support the finding of a causal
link between the actions of the agency and the abuse inflicted on Aleta.
In addition to finding that the court should have dismissed the complaint because the death
of Aleta was too remote a consequence of the county agency's actions to hold the state officials
responsible under 1983, Judge Adams stated that invoking the Civil Rights Act for this type of
suit extended the Act beyond the purposes for which Congress enacted it. He noted that Congress
enacted Section 1983 primarily to deal with acts of discrimination by state officials and that the
courts should not extend this legislation to contexts far beyond what Congress originally intended.
Id.
258 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1754 (1985). For a discussion of Jensen,
see supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
26o 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985). For a discussion of Bailey, see supra notes 218-58 and accom-
panying text.
261 See Bailey, 768 F.2d at 510-1 l; Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194.
262 See Bailey,ey 768 F.2d at 511; Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194 n.11.
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as critical in determining whether or not a special relationship exists between the gov-
ernment and an abused child: was the child in the government's custody, and was the
government aware that the child was being subjected to abuse?
The Third Circuit in Bailey, in finding that a special relationship existed on the facts
of the case before it, noted that the county child protection agency had taken the abused
child into custody and placed her in the protective custody of a relative before returning
her to her home where she was fatally abused. 265 The Fourth Circuit in Jensen stated
that a custodial relationship between the state and an individual was an important factor
in the special relationship analysis. 264 Thus, the cases indicate that a plaintiff likely will
be able to establish a special relationship and the resulting constitutional duty upon the
government to protect a child from abuse if the child was in state custody at the time of
the abuse or prior to it. 265
It is clear, however, that the lack of a custodial relationship between the government
and an abused child will not necessarily preclude the finding of a special relationship.
In the Jensen case, the Fourth Circuit specifically found that the right to be protected by
the government was not limited to situations where an individual was in the government's
custody. 266 In addition, although the custodial relationship between the abused child and
the county child protection agency in Bailey was an important factor in the Third Circuit's
finding of a special relationship, the Bailey court also pointed out that a constitutional
duty to protect persons who were not in custody had been imposed on state and local
entities. 267 Therefore, although a child who has been taken into the government's custody
can claim a constitutional right to receive protection from further child abuse, the lack
of a custodial relationship will not preclude the finding of such a right. 268
Absent a custodial relationship between the state and an abused child, the Jensen
and Bailey decisions indicate that a duty upon the government to protect a child from
abuse will exist if the government is aware that a particular child is being abused. 269 In
Jensen, the Fourth Circuit stated that there was evidence that the state knew the children
were being abused and that this fact strengthened the argument that a special relation-
ship had been formed. 27° The Third Circuit in Bailey, in determining that a special
relationship existed on the facts alleged in the complaint, noted that the county child
protection agency was aware of evidence that the child was being abused and received
specific confirmation of the abuse by a physician who examined the child. 27 t
263 See Bailey, 768 F.2d at 510-11.
264
	
Jensen, 747 F.2d at 195 n.11.
263 The Second Circuit's decision in Doe v. New York City Dept of Social Servs. supports the
view that a court likely would find the presence of a special relationship and the resulting duty of
protection based solely on a custodial relationship between the state and a child. 649 F.2d 134 (2d
Cir. 1981). The Doe court found that an agency which had placed a child in a foster home could
be held responsible under Section 1983 for the abuse inflicted upon the child by her foster father,
even though the agency had no actual knowledge that the foster father was abusing the child. Id.
at 138, 144-45. Although the Doe court did not conduct a special relationship analysis, it did state
that when an individual is placed in the custody of the state, affirmative duties are sometimes placed
on the state, the nonperformance of which may violate the constitution. Id. at 141.
/"Jerisen, 747 F.2d at: 194.
267 Bailey, 768 F.2d at 510.
268 See id.; Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194.
266 See Bailey, 768 F.2d at 510-11; Jensen, 747 F.2d at 195 n.11.
276 Jensen, 747 F.2d at 195 n.11.
271 Bailey, 768 F.2d at 510.
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In summary, the Jensen and Bailey cases establish that a constitutional duty to protect
a child from the abuse inflicted by a parent may arise upon the finding of a special
relationship between the government and the child. 272
 Plaintiffs probably will succeed in
establishing that a special relationship exists between the government and an abused
child by showing that the child had been placed in the custody of the government while
or prior to being abused. In addition, a court probably will find a special relationship
and resulting duty to protect a child from abuse upon a showing that the government
was aware that the child was being abused.
Although the above factors emerge from these cases, the Jensen and Bailey decisions
unfortunately do not provide child protection workers with clear guidance. Neither the
Jensen nor the Bailey court provided a comprehensive definition of the type of evidence
that would permit the finding of a special relationship. 273 Instead, both courts indicated
that they would determine whether or not a special relationship exists in future cases by
looking at the circumstances of each particular case. 274
 The failure of the Jensen and
Bailey courts to define clearly the circumstances in which they will find a special relation-
ship leaves child protection workers uncertain as to when they are under a constitutional
duty to protect children from abuse.
B. The Required Level of Culpable Conduct Will Not Be Present in Most Instances When Child
Protection Workers Fail to Prevent Child Abuse
In addition to having the burden of establishing that an abused child possessed a
constitutional right to protection, a plaintiff seeking to hold the government and its
employees liable under section 1983 for failing to protect a child from abuse also will
have the burden of establishing that the type of governmental conduct necessary to
recover in such a suit was present. 275 Although section 1983 itself does not impose a
standard of conduct requirement, a plaintiff must establish the violation of a constitu-
tional right in order to recover in a section 1983 action. 276 In Daniels v. Williams, the
Supreme Court held that negligent conduct on the part of government officials which
causes unintended loss or injury to life, liberty, or property does not violate the four-
teenth amendment due process clause.277 The Daniels Court left open the possibility that
less than intentional conduct by government officials, such as recklessness or gross
negligence, violates the due process clause. 27g Therefore, a plaintiff seeking to recover
in a section 1983 suit based on an alleged violation of the fourteenth amendment due
process clause will have to prove that the government's failure to protect a child from
272 /d. at 510-11; Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194.
273 Bailey, 768 F.2d at 511; Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194.
274 The Bailey court held that on the facts of the case before it, the plaintiff had alleged
sufficiently the presence of a special relationship in the complaint. 768 F.2d at 510-11. See supra
note 250 for the factors the Bailey court found sufficient to support that finding. The Jensen court
listed three factors it would look to in future cases in conducting a special relationship analysis. 747
F.2d at 194 n.1 1. See also notes 250-58. The presence or absence of any particular factor, however,
would not appear to be decisive to the Jensen court. See id.
278 See Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662, 664 (1986).
276 Id.
2" Id. See also Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668, 670, 671 (1986). For a discussion of Daniels
and Davidson, see supra notes 87-111 and accompanying text.
278 Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 667 n.3.
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abuse was the result of governmental conduct that consisted not merely of a lack of due
care, but instead consisted of at least recklessness or gross negligence. 279
Conduct which rises to the level of recklessness or gross negligence probably will
not be present in most situations in which the government fails to protect a child from
abuse. In investigating reports of suspected child abuse, conflicting, ambiguous, and
incomplete evidence often confronts child protection workers. 2" Based on this evidence,
workers must exercise their professional judgment in deciding whether abuse exists in
any given case.2 s 1 Furthermore, if a child protection worker makes a determination that
a child has been abused, he or she again must exercise professional judgment in deciding
what type of action is necessary to ensure the future safety of the child." 2 For example,
the worker must determine whether the child must be removed from the family home,
or whether a less intrusive means of state intervention into the family will be sufficient
to protect the child. 2" Therefore, child protection workers must use a great deal of
discretion in determining what actions to take in response to a report of suspected
abuse. 284
In the event that a worker's determination of the appropriate action to take in a
particular case has the unfortunate and unintended result of allowing a child to suffer
further abuse, liability should not result under section 1983. In order to recover, a
plaintiff will have to prove that the worker's conduct in choosing the most appropriate
course of action rose at least to the level of gross negligence or recklessness. 285 As the
Third Circuit stated in Bailey, an error in judgment, an unforeseen tragic event, a good
279 See id. at 666, 667 n.3. Courts have difficulty drawing the line between grossly negligent or
reckless conduct and conduct that is merely negligent. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON ON THE LAW
or Toirrs 34 (5th ed. 1984). The usual meaning associated with recklessness and gross negligence
is conduct which is in "disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great to make it highly
probable that harm would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference
to the consequences." Id. Mere negligence, however, usually is described as the failure to exercise
reasonable care. Id. The uncertain and vague standards associated with these differing standards
of conduct are extremely difficult to apply in a given fact situation. Id.
2" See generally Besharov, Future Directions, supra note 3, at 163; Besharov, The Legal Aspects of
Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 Vim.. L. REV. 458, 496 (1978) [hereinafter
Besharov, Legal Aspects]; CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: A GUIDE FOR WORKERS 47, 48 (1979 U.S.
DHEW) [hereinafter GUIDE FOR WORKERS]. For a discussion of the conflicting evidence which faces
child protection workers in investigating reports of suspected abuse, see infra notes 298-303 and
accompanying text.
281 GUIDE FOR WORKERS, supra note 280, at 45, 48 (assessing the validity of reports of child
abuse is a combination of hard evidence, professional judgment, and gut reaction); Besharov, Legal
Aspects, supra note 280, at 501 (verifying to a certitude reports of suspected child abuse is almost
always difficult and often impossible). See also infra notes 304-05 and accompanying text.
282 Guide for Workers, supra note 280, at 45, 48. See also Besharov, Legal Aspects, supra note 280,
at 502 (even after child protection workers determine that a child is being abused they often cannot
assess the immediate danger to the child or the treatment needs of the family).
282 For a discussion of the types of intervention methods available to child protection workers
in providing services to abuse victims and their families, see infra notes 306-10 and accompanying
text.
284 See Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (IA] social
service worker is ... called upon to exercise discretion at crucial points in cases of suspected child
abuse ... in deciding whether the available information warrants removal of the child from the
home ... ."). See also Boyer v. Spero, No. 84—CV-219 (N.D.N.Y. July 2, 1985) (quoting Whelehan,
558 F. Supp. at 1099).
285 See Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 666, 667 n.3.; Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 670.
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faith but misinformed professional decision, or mere negligence, will not be sufficient
to impose liability under section 1983. 286 Although the line between gross negligence
and mere negligence is difficult to draw, 287
 only when a child protection worker disre-
gards clear evidence that a child has been abused and is in danger of further abuse
should a court find that the worker's conduct amounts to the grossly negligent or reckless
conduct which is required to impose liability. 288
A plaintiff seeking to impose liability not only on an individual child protection
worker but also on the government for the actions of its employee will face additional
burdens in establishing the standard of conduct necessary to recover. In order to impose
liability on a local government under section 1983, a plaintiff will have to prove that the
execution of an official government policy by a government agent or employee resulted
in the injuries suffered by the child. 289 In addition, in order to establish a deprivation
of fourteenth amendment due process rights, the plaintiff will have the burden of
proving that the adoption of the official government policy at issue was the result of
culpable conduct on the part of policy making officials that rose to the level of reckless-
ness or gross negligence. 290 As the Third Circuit indicated in Bailey, policies which are
accepted widely by government child protection agencies and are reasonably considered
sufficient to protect abused children will not give rise to an inference of the type of
conduct necessary to establish a violation of the fourteenth amendment. 291
In summary, a plaintiff will have a difficult burden in establishing that the govern-
ment and its workers who fail to protect a child from abuse engaged in the type of
conduct required to support the finding of a violation of the fourteenth amendment
due process clause and enable recovery under section 1983. 292 A mere mistake in judg-
ment or even the failure to exercise due care will not be sufficient to impose liability in
such an action.293 Plaintiffs will have to prove that the conduct of government officials
who fail to protect an abused child rose to the level of at least gross negligence or
recklessness. 294
The difficult burden confronting plaintiffs who seek to recover damages for the
government's failure to protect abused children is justified. The government and its
child protection workers should not be subjected to civil liability for judgments, made in
the face of ambiguous and incomplete evidence, which have the unintended result of
allowing a child to suffer further injuries from an abusing parent. Such erroneous
judgments by child protection officials do not amount to the type of arbitrary abuse of
governmental power which the fourteenth amendment due process clause historically
has been applied to protect against. 286
288 Bailey, 768 F.2d at 508.
287 See supra note 279.
288 See Bailey, 768 F.2d at 508.
289 See Monell v. Dept of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). See also supra note 129 and
accompanying text.
29° Bailey, 768 F.2d at 508. See also Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 666, 667 n.3.
291
 Bailey, 768 F.2d at 508.
292 1d. at 508, 511.
29' See id. at 508. See also Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 666.
29* See Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 666, 667 n.3.
29' See id. at 665. A plaintiff also will have the burden of establishing a causal link between the
government's conduct and the injuries suffered by an abused child in order to recover in a section
1983 claim, See Bailey, 768 F.2d at 511. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against the govern-
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C. The Practical Implications of Governmental Liability for Failing to Prevent Child Abuse —
A Rationale for Absolute Immunity
As the Jensen and Bailey decisions indicate, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on
the government and its child protection workers for failing to prevent child abuse will
confront difficult burdens in establishing the elements necessary to recover in a section
1983 action. 296
 Despite these difficult burdens, the cases clearly indicate that recovery in
such a suit is possible. Although the protection of children from the abuse of their
parents is clearly a desirable social objective, subjecting the government and its workers
to potential liability for failing to protect abused children will have several far-reaching
and harmful repercussions. First, the potential for liability will deter child protection
workers from exercising their professional judgment in child abuse proceedings and
thus inhibit the effective performance of their duties. In addition, the threat of liability
if a child suffers further injuries from abuse likely will result in needless and potentially
harmful government overintervention into the families of suspected abuse victims. Fur-
thermore, substantial financial burdens will be imposed on the child protection system
as•a result of the possibility of liability. Based on these negative practical implications,
the government and its child protection workers should be absolutely immune from
damage suits arising out of the failure to protect children from abuse.
The duties of investigating reports of suspected child abuse and determining how
to protect abused children in the most effective way require child protection workers to
exercise professional judgment. 297
 In investigating child abuse reports, workers are often
confronted with inconsistent and incomplete evidence. 498 For example, a parent may
ment and its workers for conduct which causes a person to be subjected to the deprivation of a
constitutional right. See supra note 17 for the text of Section 1983. The decisions in Bailey and
Martinez provide a basis for determining how a court will analyze the issue of causation in a section
1983 action against the government and its child protection workers who fail to prevent children
from being abused by their parents.
In Martinez, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, on causation grounds, of a section 1983
claim seeking to impose liability on members of a state parole board for a murder committed by a
parolee. 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1985). In concluding that the plaintiffs had not established a sufficient
causal connection between the parole decision and the murder, the Court noted that the perpetrator
of the murder was not an agent of the parole board, the murder occurred five months after the
parole decision, and the parole officers were unaware that the victim, unlike the members of the
general public, faced special dangers. Id. The Third Circuit in Bailey, in distinguishing Martinez,
found that the complaint alleged a sufficient causal connection between the conduct of the county
child protection agency and the fatal abuse of Aleta Bailey. Bailey, 768 F.2d at 511. The Bailey
majority held that the county child protection agency, unlike the defendants in Martinez, was aware
that Aleta faced special dangers not faced by the general public. Id.
The critical factor in determining whether the plaintiff has established the causation element
in a section 1983 suit against the government for failing to prevent child abuse appears to be
whether the government was aware that the particular child, as distinguished from the rest of the
public, was being subjected to abuse. If the government had reason to know that the child was
being abused, then a court relying on Bailey and Martinez likely would find a sufficient causal link
between the government's failure to act to protect the child and the injuries received by the child
at the hands of a parent. Therefore, the element of causation probably will be established if the
government previously had received a report identifying the child as a suspected victim of abuse.
296 See supra notes 259-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements necessary to
be proven in order to recover.
297 GUIDE FOR WORKERS, supra note 280, at 45, 48. See also supra note 284.
298 See Besharov, Future Directions, supra note 3, at 163; Besharov, Legal Aspects, supra note 280,
at 496; GUIDE FOR WORKERS, supra note 280, at 47, 48.
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explain a child's injury as resulting from some cause other than child abuse. 239 Medical
evidence may establish, however, that the injury could not have occurred as the parent
explained. 333 Nevertheless, the evidence may not establish conclusively that the cause of
the injury was abuse.30 ' In addition, because child abuse frequently occurs in the privacy
of the family home, there are often no independent witnesses to question." 2 Further-
more, abusing families often conceal information from child protection workers during
child abuse investigations. 333 Due to the lack of conclusive evidence available during child
abuse investigations, child protection workers face difficult decisions in determining
whether children actually have suffered abuse."' The child protection worker must
weigh the available evidence and based on professional judgment, make a determination
as to whether or not a child has been abused."
If a child protection worker determines that a child has been abused, the worker
again must exercise judgment in determining what method of intervention into the
family will be appropriate to protect the child from further abuse." The methods by
which child protection workers may intervene into families to protect abused children
range from providing supportive services such as parental aides, parental education
programs, day care, counselling, and homemaker care to more intrusive types of inter-
vention, such as removing the child from the home and instituting court proceedings
charging the parents with abuse."' In deciding what method of intervention to use in
any particular case, the child protection worker must assess the likelihood and extent of
future danger faced by the child and determine what action will sufficiently protect the
child from that danger."' The lack of conclusive evidence in child abuse investigations
and the possibility that the child's home situation may deteriorate rapidly without any
warning to the child protection worker complicates the determination of what interven-
tion is most appropriate. 309 Therefore, based on the imprecise nature of the child abuse
investigation process, the decision as to what, if any, governmental intervention is ap-
propriate in a particular case must be based on the child protection worker's evaluation
of the available evidence in light of the worker's training and professional judgment."'
Subjecting child protection officials to civil liability for decisions which have the
unfortunate result of allowing a child to suffer further abuse will color their evaluation
299 Besharov, Legal Aspects, supra note 280, at 501-02; GUIDE FOR WORKERS, supra note 280, at
47, 48.
3°° GUIDE FOR WORKERS, supra note 280, at 48.
3° ' Besharov, Legal Aspects, supra note 280, at 501-02.
3°3 Id. at 496.
383 Besharov, Future Directions, supra note 3, at 163.
3" Besharov, Legal Aspects, supra note 280, at 501-02.
101 GUIDE FOR WORKERS, supra note 280, at 45, 48.
3°6 Id.
907 See Besharov, Future Directions, supra note 3, at 160; Besharov, Legal Aspects, supra note 280,
at 495; RESOURCE MATERIALS: A CURRICULUM ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 80 (U.S. DHEW 1979).
All states allow for the emergency removal of children from their homes in circumstances where
the child's life or health is in imminent danger. See State Child Abuse Statutes, supra note 3, at 264;
Besharov, Legal Aspects, supra note 280, at 485; GUIDE FOR WORKERS, supra note 280, at 50. Following
the removal of the child from the home, the removing authority must file a petition in court for a
review of the removal decision, usually within 48 hours of the removal, GUIDE FOR WORKERS, supra
note 280, at 50; Agency Procedures, supra note 4, at 48.
U° GUIDE FOR WORKERS, supra note 280, at 48.
S09 See Besharov, Future Directions, supra note 3, at 163.
310 See GUIDE FOR WORKERS, supra note 280, at 45, 48.
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of the evidence in child abuse investigations and deter them from the impartial exercise
of their professional judgments'' The threat of potential liability if a child were to suffer
further injuries from abuse probably will result in workers more readily confirming
reports of suspected abuse and using more drastic methods of intervention into families
iri order to avoid liability. 312 For example, a child abuse investigator faced with conflicting
evidence may conclude that a child has been abused, not on the basis of an impartial
weighing of the evidence in light of the worker's training and experience, but rather on
the basis Of an attempt to avoid liability. 313 Likewise, a worker's decision as to what
method of intervention to pursue may not be determined by the worker's assessment,
based on all the evidence, of what method is sufficient to protect the child, but rather
by the threat of liability should the child suffer additional injuries. 3 '4 For example, a
worker faced with a close question as to whether a child is in danger of suffering further
abuse may decide to remove the child from the family home and institute court pro-
ceedings charging the parents with abuse just to avoid the possibility of being subjected
to liability. 3 " Thus, the threat of liability for failing to protect children from abuse will
deter child protection workers from exercising the professional judgment which is es-
sential to the effective performance of their duties. 3 ' 6
In addition to deterring child protection workers from exercising professional judg-
ment, subjecting the government and its workers to liability for failing to protect abused
children will result in needless and potentially harmful governmental intervention into
the family. 3 " Faced with the threat of liability if a suspected abuse victim suffers further
5 " See Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (state employees responsible
for the prosecution of child neglect proceedings must be able to perform their tasks without fear
of liability); Boyer v. Spero, No. 84—CV-219 (N.D.N.Y. July 2, 1985) (liability for actions taken in
child protection proceedings would deter workers from filing and pursuing "indicated" reports of
abuse); Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) ("if social services
workers were required to guard against Section 1983 claims ... " arising from decisions on whether
or not to file a petition charging child abuse and neglect, "their evaluation of the information at
hand could easily be colored"). See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515 (1978) (the threat of
liability for their decisions would distort the discretion exercised by federal agency officials charged
with functions analogous to those of a prosecutor); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-25
(1976) (threat of potential liability would constrain prosecutors from exercising their best judgment
in deciding which suits to initiate and how to prosecute them).
512 See generally Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980) (potential liability
of municipality for unconstitutional policies would cause municipal policy making officials to act to
avoid unconstitutional conduct). See also D. BESHAROV, 1 I1E VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER: LIABILITY
FOR SERVING CHILDREN AND YOUTH 114 (1985). [hereinafter VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER].
512 See VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 312, at 136, 137.
'i 4 See
315 1d. at 137 ("social workers may more quickly — but prematurely — remove children from
troubled families rather than risk being sued on behalf of an abused child").
3111 See id. at 136, 137. See also cases at supra note 311.
317 Intervention by the government into the family to protect children from abuse involves two
competing social policies: the protection of abused children and the right of the family to be
autonomous. See BOURNE & NEWBERGER, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 97
(1981) [hereinafter CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES]; Wingo and Freitag, Decisions Within the Family: A Clash
of Constitutional Rights, 67 IOWA L. REV. 401 (1982). The Supreme Court has recognized continually
the right of the family to be free from undue state interference. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of.Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972). The right of parents to raise their children as they see fit yields, however, when in conflict
with the best interests of a child. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). Thus, government
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injuries, child protection workers probably will use more drastic methods of intervention
into the family in order to ensure that the child is protected." The fact that child
protection workers previously have been granted absolute immunity from suit for de-
priving parents of parental rights in the course of child abuse investigations also will
lead to increased intervention." Child protection workers faced with liability if a child
suffers further abuse, but immunity for overintervention, obviously will choose to ov-
erintervene and avoid liability. Similarly, in an effort to avoid liability, government
agencies probably will institute policies which support the use of overly drastic methodS
of intervention,320 including policies which encourage the removal of suspected abuse
victims from their homes and the institution of court proceedings charging parents with
abuse.32 '
While, at first glance, increased intervention into the family may further the pro-
tection of children from abuse, drastic governmental intervention usually has been
viewed by commentators as being unnecessary.322 Commentators agree that removing a
child from the home should be considered only as a last resort if necessary to protect
the child from imminent danger.'" Only rarely, however, are suspected abuse victims
subjected to such imminently dangerous situations as to require removal from the family
home.324 Generally, the use of less intrusive types of governtnent intervention will suf-
ficiently protect victims of child abuse from further harm. 323 Commentators have stated
that the use of supportive family services, such as counselling, day care, homemaker
care, and parental aide programs, which do not require the removal of children from
their homes, usually are sufficient to prevent abuse victims from suffering further
injuries. 326
In addition to the likelihood that removing a suspected abuse victim from the family
home will not be necessary to protect the child, removing a child from the home presents
the possible danger of causing psychological harm to that child. 327 A child who is removed
from the home and placed in protective custody may view such removal as punishment, 328
intervention when necessary to protect children from abuse has been found to be a justified intrusion
on the parent/child relationship. See CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 317, at 97.
318 See VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 312, at 136.
319 See generally Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093,1098-99 (W.D.N.Y. 1983)
(social workers absolutely immune from suit for alleged deprivation of parental rights during the
course of a child abuse investigation).
S40 See generally Owen, 445 U.S. at 651-52. See also VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 312,
at 158 ("Agencies, through the use of rules, incentives, and discipline, may explicitly or implicitly
rely on the same risk-aversion techniques that individual officials currently use").
321 All states have statutory provisions which allow either the police or child protection officials
to remove a child from the home, without a court order, if the child is in imminent danger of
further abuse. See supra note 307.
3" See State Child Abuse Statutes, supra note 3, at 264; Besharov, Legal Aspects, supra note 280, at
484.
323 Agency Procedures, supra note 4, at 48; GUIDE FOR WORKERS, supra note 280, at 50.
324 See V. DEFRANCIS & C. LUCHT, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970's 184 (1974).
325 See Stale Child Abuse Statutes, supra note 3, at 264; Besharov, Legal Aspects, supra note 280, at
484.
326 See Besharov, Legal Aspects, supra note 280, at 484.
327 See id. See also GUIDE FOR WORKERS, supra note 280, at 50 (emergency placement of a child
may cause serious disruption of the family unit as well as emotional problems for the child).
328 State Child Abuse Statutes, supra note 3, at 264-65; Besharov, Legal Aspects, supra note 280, at
484.
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thus protective custody may result in the child's confusion. Such drastic intervention by
the government also may cause the parent/child relationship to deteriorate, resulting in
even more danger to the child if and when the child returns to the home. 328 Furthermore,
studies indicate that removing a child from the home, even for a short period of time,
can have drastic effects on a child's development."" According to child psychologists,
separating a child from his or her parents can disrupt the child's attachments and affect
the course of the child's emotional development."
An additional harmful consequence of removing a child from the family home is
that many children taken into protective custody are placed in foster homes which are
often unstable and inadequate. 332 Because of the many problems associated with foster
care, some clinicians have concluded that placing a child in a foster home often is more
harmful to a child than the original home situation may have been."' Despite these
negative consequences, child protection officials likely will resort to routinely removing
suspected victims of abuse from their homes in an effort to avoid potential liability for
failing to protect children. 334 Thus, subjecting the government and its child protection
officials to liability for failing to prevent child abuse will result in unnecessary and possibly
harmful governmental overintervention into the families of suspected abuse victims.
Potential liability for failing to protect abused children also will impose substantial
financial burdens on the child protection system. Child protection agencies are forced
to devote substantial resources to investigating the many reports of suspected abuse
which turn out to be unfounded.555 In 1983, approximately 1.3 million children were
reported to child protection agencies as suspected victims of abuse, 336 and studies indicate
that approximately 60% of all reports of abuse are determined to be unfounded."'
Because child protection agencies must expend substantial resources investigating these
unfounded reports, they often are unable to respond promptly and effectively when
children actually are in serious danger.338 Potential liability for failing to protect children
from abuse likely will result in child protection workers confirming reports of abuse in
cases which otherwise would have been deemed unfounded in an effort to avoid liabil-
"9 See State Child Abuse Statutes, supra note 3, at 265; Besharov, Legal Aspects, supra note 280, at
484.
"0 See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 31-
34 (1973) [hereinafter BEST INTERESTS]; CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 317, at 132 n.135 (citing
Klaus & Kennell, Mothers Separated from Their Newborn Infants, 17 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH
AMERICA 1015 (1975); Sameroff & Chandler, Reproductive Risk and the Continuum of Caretaking
Casualty, in REVIEW ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH (F. Horowitz ed. 1975)).
"' See B EST INTERESTS, supra note 330, at 32—S4.
"2 See Agency Procedures, supra note 4, at 48.
I" Besharov, Future Directions, supra note 3, at 167 (citing]. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 13 (1980)); Agency Procedures, supra note 4, at 49 (citing
C. GOULD & D. RUNYAN, FOSTER CARE FOR THE MALTREATED CHILD (1982)).
224 See supra notes 311-16 and accompanying text. In some instances, a child will be in such
danger that immediate removal from the family home is appropriate. The child protection worker
should be left to make this decision, however, on the basis of his or her training and professional
judgment and without the interference of the threat of liability.
'8 ' Besharov, Future Directions, supra note 3, at 162.
328 Besharov, Child Welfare Malpractice, supra note 6, at 56.
2" Besharov, Future Directions, supra note 3, at 162 (citing U.S. NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING
(1978) 18, Table 5 (U.S. DHEW 1979)).
2" Besharov, Future Directions, supra note 3, at 162.
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ity. 359 Providing protective services to children and families in these cases will result in
an even further drain on resources which child protection agencies could more property
use in cases where children are actually in serious danger. Thus, exposing the govern-
ment to liability for failing to prevent parents from abusing their children will exacerbate
the financial burdens which the child protection system faces.
Based on the potentially harmful repercussions of subjecting the government and
its child protection workers to liability for failing to prevent child abuse, courts should
grant the government and its workers absolute immunity from such suits. Courts afford
most public officials who exercise discretion the protection of qualified immunity from
damage suits."° Under this protection, public officials will not be held liable for uncon-
stitutional conduct if their actions are not in violation of clearly established constitutional
duties."'
Qualified immunity, however, is not a sufficient protection for public officials who
perform child protective duties. 942 As the Jensen and Bailey cases indicate, whether a child
protection worker is under a constitutional duty to provide protection to a suspected
victim of abuse will depend on a court's analysis of the mix of factors in the particular
case."' The Jensen and Bailey decisions do not provide child protection workers with
clear guidelines to determine when a court will impose upon them a constitutional duty
to protect an abused child. 3" Thus, because of the difficulty in determining when courts
will deem the constitutional duty to protect a particular child as "clearly established,"
the application of the qualified immunity standard in suits against child protection
workers is uncertain. In addition, the mere possibility that child protection workers could
be exposed to large damage awards for the consequences of their decisions will serve to
chill the exercise of their professional judgment in determining how to respond most
effectively to cases of suspected abuse.345 Therefore, because even potential liability will
have this detrimental impact on the effective performance of child protective duties,
qualified immunity from suit is not a sufficient protection for child abuse workers.
Accordingly, because their special functions require complete protection from dam-
age suits, child protection workers should be granted the defense of absolute immunity
from section 1983 liability for failing to prevent child abuse. The Supreme Court has
found that certain public officials, because of the nature of their duties, require complete
protection from damage suits."6 For example, the Court has found that prosecuting
attorneys342 and other public officials who perform analogous functions 248 are absolutely
immune from damage suits for acts taken within the scope of their prosecutorial-type
3" See supra notes 311-16 and accompanying text.
"4° Harlow v, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Id. See supra notes 115-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of qualified immunity.
342 See Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984); Boyer v. Spero, No. 84—CV-
219 (N.D.N.Y. July 2, 1985); Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (W.D.N.Y.
1983).
"" See Bailey, 768 F.2d at 511; Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194 n.11. See also supra notes 273-74 and
accompanying text.
544 See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
"5 See supra notes 311-16 and accompanying text.
546 See Harlon, 457 U.S. at 807; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-28 (1976).
'4' 'fabler, 424 U.S. at 431.
"a Butz, 438.U.S. at 515.
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duties. The Court has reasoned that these officials require complete protection from
damage suits in order to preserve the exercise of judgment which is necessary to the
proper performance of their important duties. 349
The functions of child protection workers — investigating reports of suspected child
abuse and determining what actions to take in response to the evidence gathered — are
comparable to the functions of prosecutors in the criminal justice system. 3" A prosecutor
must exercise judgment in determining which criminal violations should be prosecuted,
how the prosecution should proceed, and what sanctions should be sought. 35 ' Similarly,
child protection workers must exercise professional judgment in determining whether
the available evidence warrants a conclusion that a child has been abused 352 and what
methods of intervention are necessary to protect a child from further abuse. 353 These
determinations could result in the decision to remove a child from the home and the
initiation of court proceedings charging a parent with abuse.5" Like prosecutors and
other officials who perform analogous duties, child protection workers will be deterred
from exercising their best judgment in performing their duties if they are exposed to
liability for their- decisions."' Therefore, because child protection workers serve a vital
social function in identifying child abuse and determining how best to protect abused
children, they should be absolutely immune from suits which would inhibit the proper
performance of their duties.336
546 See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy reasons for
granting prosecutorial-type officials the protection of absolute immunity.
w See Kurzawa, 732 F.2d at 1458; Boyer, No. 84—CV-219; Whelehan, 558 F. Supp. at 1098.
331 See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425; Butz, 438 U.S. at 515.
332 See supra notes 297-305 and accompanying text.
353 See supra notes 306-10 and accompanying text.
35' See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
353 See Kurzawa, 732 F.2d at 1458; Boyer, No. 84—CV-219; Whelehan, 558 F. Supp. at 1098-99.
See also supra notes 311-16 and accompanying text.
"6 See Kurzawa, 732 F.2d at 1458; Boyer, No. 84—CV-219; Whelehan, 558 F. Supp. at 1098-99.
Granting social workers absolute immunity for their actions in connection with child abuse inves-
tigations is not a novel proposal. For example, in Boyer v. Spero, a child abuse investigator was sued
under section 1983 for alleged conduct during the course of a child abuse proceeding which resulted
in the plaintiff, the mother of the suspected abuse victim, being terminated from her employment.
No. 84—CV-219 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). The plaintiff had been employed as a child counselor with a
youth and family service agency. Id. After an investigation into the alleged abuse of plaintiff's son,
the child abuse investigator filed a report with the state Central Register indicating that some
credible evidence of abuse had been found. Id. The plaintiff alleged that she was not given notice
that she was the subject of an "indicated" abuse report. Id. The plaintiff was terminated from her
employment after the state Central Register notified the plaintiff's employer of the existence of
the abuse report. Id. Subsequent to her termination, plaintiff received a hearing to contest the
abuse report, and the hearing board ultimately found that no credible evidence of abuse existed.
Id. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the child abuse investigator's failure to provide her
with notice of the abuse report resulted in her losing her job, thus depriving her of liberty and
property rights without due process. Id.
For public policy reasons, the Boyer court held that child protection workers are entitled to the
defense of absolute immunity from suits arising out of their conduct during the post-investigatory
stages of child protection proceedings. The court stated that potential liability for such conduct
would deter child protection workers from performing their duties. Id, The court stated that because
child protection workers serve a vital social function, they must be protected from the fear of
liability for the performance of their duties. Id.
See also Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456,1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (Department of Social Services
employees responsible for prosecuting child neglect petitions must be able to perform tasks of
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In addition to granting child protection officials absolute immunity from personal
liability, courts also should grant the government absolute immunity from suits arising
out of the failure of its child protection employees to prevent child abuse. Although the
Supreme Court in Owen held that the government was not entitled to qualified immunity
for the good faith constitutional violations of its employees," 2 the Owen decision did not
address the issue of whether the government can claim the defense of absolute immunity
when its officials are entitled to that defense!'" Moreover, the Owen case did not present
the potentially devastating implications which holding the government liable for failing
to prevent child abuse presents. In Owen, the Court dealt with a police chief's suit against
a city for the actions of City Council members in discharging the police chief without
notice of the reasons for the discharge and without a hearing. 359 The Court found that
holding the city liable would encourage policy making officials, in an effort to avoid
potential liability, to enact policies which comport with constitutional rights. 360 In Owen,
holding the city liable would encourage officials to enact policies which provide city
employees with procedural due process protections before being discharged from their
jobs. These policies do not present the kinds of dangers which government policies
enacted in an attempt to avoid liability for failing to prevent child abuse would present.
In order to avoid such suits, government policy makers likely would enact policies
mandating drastic intervention into the families of suspected abuse victims, including
policies requiring the removal of suspected victims from their homes and the institution
of court proceedings charging the parents with abuse." 1 Such policies will deter child
protection workers from exercising the professional judgment necessary to perform
effectively their duties in responding to cases of suspected abuse. 3fi2 In addition, in most
cases such drastic methods of intervention will not be necessary to protect a child and
may even cause harm to a child's psychological development. 963 Therefore, in order to
avoid these potentially harmful implications, the government, as well as its child protec-
tion officials, should be absolutely immune from suits arising out of the failure to protect
children from abuse inflicted by their parents.
CONCLUSION
In recent suits filed in federal courts under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, plaintiffs have attempted to impose civil damages against the government and its
officials who, after receiving and investigating reports of suspected child abuse, (ail to
prevent children from suffering further abuse at the hands of their parents. The plain-
tiffs have alleged that the state's failure to protect children from abuse deprived the
protecting health and well-being of children without fear of harassment and are entitled to absolute
immunity); Whelehan v. County of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) ("if social
services workers were required to guard against § 1983 claims" arising from decisions on whether
or not to file a petition charging child abuse and neglect, "their evaluation of the information at
hand could easily be colored").
357 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
358
 Whelehan, 558 F. Supp. at 1104.
339 Owen, 445 U.S. at 630.
399 Id. at 651-52. For a discussion of the Owen Court's reasoning in refusing to grant qualified
immunity protection to municipalities, see supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
581 See supra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
362 See supra notes 297-310 and accompanying text.
363 See supra notes 322-31 and accompanying text.
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children of liberty rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
The decisions indicate that a plaintiff will face difficult burdens in establishing the
presence of several elements necessary to recover in such suits. Although a plaintiff will
have difficulty in proving the elements necessary to recover, the decisions clearly indicate
that recovery in a section 1983 action against the government and its workers for failing
to protect abused children is possible.
Subjecting the government and its officials to liability in such cases will result in
several far-reaching and harmful repercussions. First, potential liability will deter child
protection workers from exercising the professional judgment which is necessary to the
effective performance of their vital duties. In addition, potential liability likely will result
in overly drastic methods of intervention by the government into the families of suspected
abuse victims. Yet, such drastic intervention into the family probably will not be necessary
to protect abused children, and may even cause harm to a child's emotional development.
In order to avoid these potentially devastating consequences, the government and its
child protection workers should be absolutely immune from civil suits for the failure to
prevent parents from abusing their children.
TIMOTHY J. COURVILLE
